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Abstract
In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and an aggregate of
the actions of all the players (for example, sum, product or some moment of the distribution of
actions). Many common games in industrial organization, political economy, public economics,
and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative games. In most of these situations, the behavior
of the aggregate is of interest both directly and also indirectly because the comparative statics
of the actions of each player can be obtained as a function of the aggregate. In this paper, we
provide a general and tractable framework for comparative static results in aggregative games.
We focus on two classes of aggregative games: (1) aggregative of games with strategic substitutes
and (2) "nice" aggregative games, where payoff functions are continuous and concave in own
strategies. We provide simple sufficient conditions under which "positive shocks" to individual
players increase their own actions and have monotone effects on the aggregate. We show how
this framework can be applied to a variety of examples and how this enables more general and
stronger comparative static results than typically obtained in the literature.
"We would like to thank Roger Hartley, Jean-Francois Mertens, Alex Possajennikov, and Burkhard Schipper
for their helpful remarks and suggestions. Thanks also to seminar participants at the University of Copenhagen,
University of Manchester, and at the 2008 Midlands Game Theory Workshop in Birmingham. All remaining errors
are of course our responsibility.
department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (e-mail: daron@mit.edu )
'Department of Economics, University of Birmingham, (e-mail: m.k.jensen@bham.ac.uk)

1 Introduction
In aggregative games, each player's payoff depends on her own actions and some aggregate of
all players' actions. For example, the Cournot model of oligopoly competition is an aggregative
game; each firm's profits depend on its own quantity and total quantity supplied to the market.
More generally, the aggregate could be any mapping from the players' action profile to a real
number. 1 Numerous games studied in the literature can be cast as aggregative games. These
include the majority of the models of competition (Cournot and Bertrand with or without product
differentiation), models of
(patent) races, models of contests and fighting, models of public good provision, models with
aggregate demand externalities, and so on. In many applied problems, the focus is naturally on
how the aggregate (e.g., total supply to the market, the price index, probability of innovation,
total public good provision) responds to changes in the environment. In addition, comparative
statics of individual actions can often be obtained as a function of the aggregate. 2
In this paper, we provide a simple general framework for comparative static analysis in aggrega-
tive games. Our approach is applicable to diverse environments that can be cast as aggregative
games and enables us to provide sufficient conditions for a rich set of comparative static results.
We present two sets of results. First, we focus on aggregative games with strategic substitutes.
In games with strategic substitutes, each player's payoff function is supermodular in her own
strategy and exhibits decreasing differences in her own strategy and the strategy vector of other
players. For aggregative games with strategic substitutes, we establish the following results:
1. Changes in parameters that only affect the aggregate (such as a shift in demand in the
Cournot game) always lead to an increase in the aggregate—in the sense that the smallest
and the largest elements of the set of equilibrium aggregates increase.
2. Entry of an additional player decreases the (appropriately-defined) aggregate of the existing
players.
3. A "positive" idiosyncratic shock, defined as a parameter change that increases the marginal
payoff of a single player, leads to an increase in that player's strategy and a decrease in the
other players' aggregate.
'We discuss games with multi-dimensional aggregates in Section 7.
2The fact that a game is aggregative does not imply that players ignore the impact of their strategies on
aggregates. When they do so, we say that the equilibrium is Walrasian Nash or that the play is Walrasian. Our
results are generalized to Walrasian Nash equilibria in Section 9. Because in this case there are more more limited
"game-theoretic" interactions, the analysis is more straightforward.
The comparative static results mentioned above are intuitive. But it is surprising that for
aggregative games, they hold at the same level of generality as the monotonicity results for
supermodular games (in particular, no quasi-concavity or convexity assumptions are needed).
Nevertheless, not all aggregative games exhibit strategic substitutes. The second set of results
we present focus on "nice" aggregative games, which are games with payoff functions that are
continuous, concave (or pseudo-concave) in own strategies, and sufficiently smooth (in particu-
lar, twice continuously differentiable). Many games analyzed in industrial organization, political
economy and other areas satisfy these conditions. An example is contest (or fighting) games,
where payoffs are determined by the effort levels of all players; contests typically exhibit neither
strategic substitutes nor complements. Another example is provided by games in which players
make voluntary contributions to the provision of a public good.
We prove parallel results for nice aggregative games under an additional technical assumption,
which we refer to as local solvability. Under this assumption, which ensures the local invertibility
of the "backward reply" mapping described further below, we establish a general monotonicity
theorem similar in spirit to the monotonicity results for supermodular games. This theorem
implies that a positive shock to (one or more of) the players leads to an increase in the smallest
and largest equilibrium values of the aggregate. We also prove that entry of an additional player
increases the aggregate and derive more extensive "individual comparative static" results.
An informal summary of our results from both aggregative games with strategic substitutes
and from nice aggregative games is that, under a variety of reasonable economic conditions,
comparative statics are "regular" (for example, a reduction marginal cost increases output and so
on). Nevertheless, it should be emphasized that there is no guarantee that such intuitive results
should hold generally. The next example illustrates how counterintuitive, "perverse," results can
arise in simple games, even in simple aggregative games.
Example 1 Consider three players i = 1,2,3 with payoff functions 7Tj(s) = —0.5s? + a,(l —
a'j)
_1
(X^7=H sj) s i + ft(l — &i)~
1
Si defined locally in a sufficiently large neighborhood of the equi-
librium found below. Assume that a\ > 1, 1 > a2 > 0, Q3 < 0, 0\ < 0, 2 > 0, Qi + a 2 + Q3 > 1,
01 + 02 +03<O, and Ql + a3 < 1.
This is an aggregative game since we can write the payoffs as a function of players' own
strategies and the aggregate Q = Ylj sj : ^k{suQ) = -O.5s^+a l (l-a l )~ 1 (Q-s l )s l+0l {l-a l )~ l s i .
By strict concavity, best response functions in this game are: ri(s- t ) = aj(l — cti)~ 1 (J2 1 jH sj) +
0i(l — at)" 1 . Solving for the pure strategy Nash equilibrium (s* = ^(s^), i — 1,2,3) we obtain
s* = a tQ* + 0i, where Q* = s{ + s$ + S3 = (0i + 2 + 03)~ 1 (l - ai — 02 - a3 ) is the equilibrium
aggregate. Now consider a (small) increase in a 2 . This is a "positive shock" to player 2: holding
opponents' strategies fixed, it increases player 2's marginal payoff and therefore "lifts" player
2's best response function, 3 dr2(s-2)/doi2 > 0. yet But this positive direct effect on player 2's
optimal strategy notwithstanding, an increase in ao leads to a decrease in player 2's strategy in
equilibrium:
9s*i „-, , dQ* ft + ft + ft , ft + 02 + 03 ^ n%-*- = Q + Q2T, = -, + CX2J- ro <
As can also be seen, the positive shock to player 2 leads to a decrease in the equilibrium aggregate:
dQ*
7r- <0 -oa2
In summary, a parameter change that unambiguously increases the marginal payoff for a player,
which should, all else equal, lead to an increase in that player's strategy and the aggregate, in fact
leads to a decrease in the player's strategy in equilibrium as well as a decrease in the aggregate.
Part of the contribution of our paper is to provide minimal conditions to ensure that "perverse"
results, such as those described in the previous example, do not apply. In particular, such results
are ruled out in nice aggregative games by the local solvability assumption mentioned above. In
addition to providing minimal conditions for general comparative static results and significantly
weakening the conditions that are available in the literature (for example, for models of patent
races, contests, and public good provision), our approach is also useful because it highlights
the common features that ensure "regular" comparative static results. These results are made
possible by the alternative approach we use for deriving comparative static results (the more
familiar approaches in the literature rely on the implicit function theorem and lattice-theoretic
tools in the case of supermodular games).
Our approach can be explained as follows. Consider a general comparative static problem
written as
A • ds = —b-dt,
where dt G R is the change in some exogenous variable, ds G R^ designates the induced change
in the endogenous variables, A is an M x M matrix and b is an Af-dimensional vector. An
important question is to specify the conditions under which we can sign ds "robustly"—meaning
without specifying numerical values for the elements of the matrix A and vector b. Cast in
this generality, the conclusion is somewhat depressing: to obtain such results it is necessary to
ascertain the sign of the elements of A -1 . But even when A is symmetric negative definite, we
In other words, player 2's payoff function exhibits increasing differences in S2 and Q2 (Topkis (1978)). This is
an equivalent way of defining a "positive shock" when strategy sets are one-dimensional and payoff functions are
can do this only when one of the following two additional (and stringent) conditions hold: (i)
when A is a Metzler matrix, that is, it has non-negative off-diagonal elements, or (ii) when A is a
Morishima matrix, that is, it becomes a Metzler matrix when we reverse the sign of one or more
variables. 4 The only general case where these conditions are satisfied is provided by supermodular
games. Since many games that arise in applications are not supermodular, much of the applied
literature imposes additional parametric restrictions in the context of specific games to derive
comparative statics results. The discussion above highlights that many of these conclusions may
not be robust and in general there are no systematic investigations of when the specific conclusions
enjoy such robustness.
Our alternative approach is not to impose parametric restrictions, but to exploit the aggrega-
tive nature of the games in question and note that what is often of economic interest is not the
entire vector ds, but the behavior of the appropriate aggregate, or just one of its coordinates (the
latter corresponds to deriving robust results for a single player as opposed to all players). With
this perspective, robust and general comparative static results can be obtained under considerably
weaker conditions. Our contribution is to suggest this perspective and show how it can be made
operational.
Our paper is related to a number of different strands in the literature. Comparative static
results in most games are obtained using the implicit function theorem. The main exception is
for supermodular games (games with strategic complements). Topkis (1978, 1979), Milgrom and
Roberts (1990) and Vives (1990) provide a framework for deriving comparative static results in
such games. These methods do not extend beyond supermodular games.
More closely related to our work, and in many ways its precursor, is Corchon (1994). Corchon
(1994) provides comparative static results for aggregative games with strategic substitutes, but
only under fairly restrictive conditions, which, among other things, ensure uniqueness of equi-
libria. These conditions are typically not easy to check in many applied problems. In contrast,
we provide general comparative static results for aggregative games with strategic substitutes
without imposing any additional assumptions. We also provide parallel but stronger results for
nice aggregative games without strategic substitutes. Another similarity between our paper and
Corchon (1994) is that both make use of the so-called backward reply correspondence of Selten
(1970). In an aggregative game, the backward reply correspondence gives the (best response)
strategies of players that are compatible with a given value of the aggregate. 5 In a seminal paper,
4 See Bassett et al (1968) and Hale et al (1999).
The first systematic study of aggregative games (German: aggregierbaren Spiele) can be found in Selten (1970).
After defining aggregative games, Selten proceeds to define what he calls the Empassungsfunktion (Selten (1970),
p. 154), that is, the backward reply function of an individual player. As Selten proves, the backward reply
correspondence is single-valued (a function) provided that the player's best-response function has slope greater
Novshek (1985) used this correspondence to give the first general proof of the existence of pure-
strategy equilibria in the Cournot model without assuming quasi-concavity of payoff functions
(see also Kukushkin (1994)). Novshek's result has since been strengthened and generalized to a
larger class of aggregative games (e.g., Dubey et al. (2006) and Jensen (2007)) and our results on
games with strategic substitutes utilize Novshek (1985)'s construction in the proofs. 6 Our results
on "nice" aggregative games blend the backward reply approach with the equilibrium comparison
results reported in Milgrom and Roberts (1994) and Villas-Boas (1997). 7
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides basic definitions. Section
3 presents a number of common examples, which can be cast as aggregative games. Section 4
provides the general comparative static results for aggregative games with strategic substitutes.
Section 5 generalizes and strengthens these results for "nice" aggregative games, which feature
payoffs that are continuous and (pseudo-)concave in own strategies. Section 6 shows how the
results from Sections 4 and 5 can be used to obtain general characterization results in various ap-
plications. Section 7 discusses how these results can be extended to games with multi-dimensional
aggregates and Section 8 provides additional generalizations of the results presented in Section 5.
Section 9 briefly discusses Walrasian Nash equilibria (cf. footnote 2). Section 10 concludes and
the Appendix contains the proofs omitted from the text.
2 Basic Definitions
In this section, we introduce some basic definitions.
Let r = (iri, Si,T) l€j denote a noncooperative game with a finite set of players 1 = {1,...,/},
and finite-dimensional strategy sets 5, C RN . In addition, T C RM is a set of exogenous pa-
rameters with typical element t
€
T. We will focus on how the set of equilibria of T changes in
response to changes in t.
Throughout the rest of the paper we assume that the joint strategy set
than —1. The assumptions imposed by Corchon (1994) imply that the slope of players' best-response functions lie
strictly between -1 and 0, so that the backward reply correspondence is both single-valued and decreasing. Neither
is necessarily the case in many common games and neither is imposed in this paper.
6 Novshek's explicit characterization of equilibria is similar to the characterization of equilibrium in supermodular
games that uses the fixed point theorem of Tarski (1955). Both of these enable the explicit study of the behavior
of "largest" and "smallest" fixed points in response to parameter changes. Tarski's result is used, for example, in
the proof of Theorem 6 in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
More specifically, our proofs repeatedly use that the smallest and largest fixed points of a continuous function
from a subset of real numbers into itself will increase when the curve is "shifted up" (see Figure 1 of Villas-Boas
(1997) or Figure 2 of Milgrom and Roberts (1994)).
is compact (in the usual topology) and the payoff functions
TTj : S x T -> R
are upper semi-continuous for each i E X. Let
Ri{s-i, t) = arg max ^(s,, s_ 2 , £)
•s,e5,
denote the best response correspondence (with the standard notation S-i 6 S-i = Yijjti Sj)- Given
the compactness and upper semi-continuity assumptions, the correspondence Ri is non-empty-
and compact-valued, and upper hemi-continuous.
We next define the notion of an aggregator.
Definition 1 (Aggregator) A mapping g : S —» R^ (with K < N) is an aggregator if it is
continuous, increasing and separable across the players, i.e., if there exists a strictly increasing
function H : RK —> R^" and increasing functions hi : St —> R^ (for each i£l) such that:
(1)
Throughout this paper K is referred to as the dimension of the aggregate. For most of the
analysis (in particular, until Section 7), we impose K = 1, but throughout there are no restrictions
on N. In particular, except Corollary 3 in Section 8, none of our results require N — 1 (one-
dimensional strategy sets). The requirement that g is increasing in s ensures that both g and
—g cannot be aggregators for the same game. Naturally, since we can change the order on
individual strategies (thus working with —s l instead of Sj for some i), this requirement is not very
restrictive. Common examples, such as the sum of strategies g(s) — X^?=i sj> satisfy the definition
(with hi(si) = Si and H(z) = z). Two other simple examples are g(s) — (ajSj 4- . .. + oms'n )
1^
,
S C RN
,
and g(s) = ^=1^, S C R^_+ where ay > (for each j) and > 0, which are,
respectively, a CES function and a Cobb-Douglas function. 8
Remark 1 (Differentiability and Aggregation) In the case of one-dimensional strategy sets,
Definition 1 is the standard definition of separability when g is strictly increasing (see, e.g.,
Gorman (1968)). It can be easily established that when g is twice continuously differentiable,
Ar = K = 1, and / > 3, it is separable if and only if the "marginal rate of transformation"
between any two players i and j is independent of the other players' actions; that is,
D s ,g(s)
DS3 g(s)
= hij(si, Sj) for all s 6 S (2)
8
In the first case /ii(s s ) = Q^sf (with Si > 0) and H(z) = z l/a . In the second hi(s t ) = a;log(s,) and H(z) =
exp(z) (again with Si > 0).
where h%j : Si x Sj —> ii is a function of Sj and Sj, but not of any s q with q ^ i,j. More generally,
when g is twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and / > 3, it may be verified that
it satisfies Definition 3 if and only if there exist increasing functions fi : St x RK —> RN such that
for each player i 6l:
Ds,g(s) = fi{si,g{s)) for all s e S. (3)
When g is increasing (and not necessarily strictly increasing), as is the case in Definition 1,
(3) is still implied provided that g is also twice continuously differentiable. This observation will
play an important role in Section 5. Clearly, equation (3) also gives an alternative and often very
convenient way of verifying that a strictly increasing function g is an aggregator.
Definition 2 (Aggregative Game) The game Y = (tt,, 5.,,T),gi is aggregative if there exists
an aggregator g : S —> K^ and a reduced payoff function
K
for each player i such that
IL : Si x R x T
Yli{si,g{s),t) = ni (si,s-it t)
.
(4)
Clearly, an aggregative game is fully summarized by the tuple ((11*, Si) tej,g, T).
Another key concept we will use is games with strategic substitutes. 9 We say that the payoff
function 7r,(s,, s_,-, t) exhibits decreasing differences in Sj and s- z if for all s\ > Sj, the "difference"
7Ti(s^, s_j, t) - 7Tj(sj,s_i,t) is a decreasing function in each of the coordinates of s_j G 5_ t C
fl£iv(j-i)_ \\rhen 7Ti }s twice differentiable, this will hold if and only if D^. s 7Tj(si,s_i, t) is a non-
positive matrix for all j ^ i. The payoff function m(si,s-i,t) is super-modular in s, if 7r 2 (s 2 V
Si, s-i,t) + 7Ti(sj A Sj, s-i, t) > 7r,(sj, s_;, t) + 7Ti(si, s_j, t) for all s z , Sj e Si (and s_ t G 5
1
-,, t G T).
Here Sj V s t (s t A s ? ) denotes the coordinatewise maximum (minimum) of the vectors s, and s t .
Naturally, this definition requires that s t V s r and s, A Sj are contained in St whenever Sj, s, £5,.
i.e., Sj must be a lattice. When strategy sets are one-dimensional, supermodularity as well as the
lattice-structure of strategy sets are automatically satisfied, so only decreasing differences remains
to be checked. For multi-dimensional strategy sets, supermodularity holds for twice differentiable
payoff functions if and only if D^n
s
miTi(si, S-i, t) > for all m ^ n (where s" and sj1 denote the
nth and mth components of of the strategy vector s
r
of player i).
9When a game does not feature strategic substitutes, we will impose additional conditions, and in particular,
we will focus on "nice games" that satisfy certain concavity and differentiability conditions. Since we do not make
use of these until Section 5, we do not introduce this concept until then.
Definition 3 (Strategic Substitutes) The game F = (7iv, Sj)iex is a game with strategic sub-
stitutes if strategy sets are lattices and each player's payoff Junction TTi(si,S-i,t) is supermodular
in Si and exhibits decreasing differences in s, and s_,.
Equivalently, we will also say that a game has (or features) strategic substitutes. A game that
is both aggregative and has strategic substitutes, is an aggregative game with strategic substitutes.
Notice that decreasing differences usually is straightforward to verify in aggregative games. In
fact, when the aggregator g is a symmetric function there will only be one condition to check for
each player. For instance, consider an aggregative game with linear aggregator g(s) = Y2J= i sj
and one-dimensional strategy sets, so that 11^ ( Sj, J2j=i sj' — 7ri( s ii 5 -ii *) ^ ni *s sufficiently
smooth, then decreasing differences is equivalent to nonpositive cross-partials, i.e., D^ s tt{ =
Dj 2 n,' + D^Ri < 0. This immediately implies that if decreasing differences holds for some
opponent j, it must hold for all opponents.
Remark 2 (Strategic Substitutes and Decreasing Differences in s and Q) Unless players
take Q as given (as in Walrasian Nash equilibria in Section 9), there is no tight relationship between
strategic substitutes and the condition that Yli(si,Q) exhibits decreasing differences in Si and Q
(the latter may be thought of as "strategic substitutes in Si and the aggregate Q"). For example,
suppose that AT = 1, g(s) = ^q=i s^ ar>d assume that payoff functions are twice differentiable.
Then strategic substitutes requires that D^
s
I1j(sj, J2q=i sq)
= D^^-iisi, Q) + ^22^»(s*i Q) - ®
where Q = ]T\=i s q- Decreasing differences in s, and Q requires that Df2^i{si,Q) < 0. Clearly
neither condition implies the other. If .D^IMs^Q) < 0, then our strategic substitutes condition
is weaker and we can have D^2^U(si, Q) > in a game with strategic substitutes.
Finally, we define an equilibrium in the standard fashion.
Definition 4 (Equilibrium) Let ((U l ,Si) iei,g,T) be an aggregative game. Then s*(t) =
(si(£), . . . ,s*j(t)) is a (pure-strategy Nash) equilibrium if for each player i 6 X,
s*{t) £ argmaxni (s ! ,g(s J ,sl l ),t).
3 Examples of Aggregative Games
In this section, we present several games that have been widely studied in the literature. In each
case, we show how they can be cast as aggregative games. For now, we focus on games with one-
dimensional aggregates, returning to the those with multi-dimensional aggregates in Section 7.
Throughout this section, we drop dependence on the parameter vector t <E T to simplify notation.
8
3.1 Cournot Competition
As already mentioned in the Introduction, Cournot games are aggregative games. Consider the
following generalized-Cournot game. There are / firms, each choosing their quantity m € X{ c K+.
The market price faced by firm i is
Pi = Pi{qi,Q)
,
where
Q : Xi x ... x Xj.-> R+
is an index of aggregate quantity. We assume that Q is separable and strictly increasing in each
of its arguments (hence it is an aggregator). Firm i's profits are
n, (ft, Q) = iTi fe, q-i) = Pi (qi, Q) q% - c?; (qr ) ,
where q (qi) is an increasing function representing firm i's costs. It is clear that this is an
aggregative game.
The most familiar case is that of Cournot competition with homogeneous products, where
Q — Y^i=j qi anc^ Piilii Q) = P (Q)- In this case, provided that P is a nonincreasing and concave
function of Q, this is also a game with strategic substitutes (as defined in Definition 3). Indeed,
for q\ > qi, it is straightforward to verify that
m {& q-i) - n [qu q-i) = P{Q + q[- qi) q[ - q (<?0 - P (Q) <?, + c, (q t )
is decreasing in qj for each j j^ i.
It is also straightforward to add a technology choice to this model. This extension is interesting,
among other things, for the analysis of technological investments in oligopolistic industries. In
particular, suppose that the cost function of each firm is Cj (qi, a,i) for some measure of technological
investment a t € A,. In addition, there is a cost of technological investment given by C, (a,). In
this case, we have
U l (ql ,a l ,Q) = m (ql ,q- l ,a l ,a- i ) = Pl (q l ,Q)ql - Ci(qi,a,i) - C, (a t )
.
We return to an analysis of this model in Section 6.
3.2 Bertrand Competition
Similarly, models of Bertrand competition with differentiated products typically correspond to
aggregative games. In such models, firms choose their prices, pz £ A', C R+. Suppose that firm i
is able to sell quantity qx given by
qi = Qi (Pi,P)
,
where
P : Xi x ..... x Xi -> K+
is a price index (and again P is separable and strictly increasing in each of its arguments). Firm
i profits are given by
7i"t {Pi, P-i) = n t (pi, P) = piQi (pi, P) - a (Qi (pi, P))
.
Clearly, this is again an aggregative game. Perhaps the most commonly studied case is the
constant elasticity of demand (Dixit-Stiglitz) model of monopolistic competition, where
cr-l
/ 1 \
P
and a corresponds to the elasticity of substitution between products in the representative con-
sumers' utility function, while Qi(pi,P) = mp~aPa
~ l
,
with m > 0, corresponds to the total
spending of the representative consumer. The reduced payoff function of firm i can then be
written as
IT fa, P) = mpl-op*-
1
- Cl (mp-°P°- 1 ) .
3.3 Patent Races
The following model of patent races due to Loury (1979) highlights how various different models of
innovation can be cast as aggregative games. Suppose that / firms are competing for an innovation
and the value of the innovation to firm i is Vl > 0. The model is in continuous time, and each
firm chooses a constant R&D intensity at every date, denoted by s,. Firm i generates a flow rate
of innovation of hi (sj) as a result of this R&D. The cost of R&D is c; (s,). Both h x and Ci are
increasing functions. The first firm to innovate receives the prize. All firms discount the future
at the rate R > 0. It can be shown that firm i's expected profits can be written as
/ Vi-h {Si) • exp - Ir + ]T h,{ Sj ) It) dt- Cl (s
It is straightforward to verify that this is an aggregative game with the aggregator given by
3.4 Models of Contests and Fighting
Loury's model, of patent races described in the previous subsection is a special case of models
of contests and fighting, for example, as developed by Tullock (1980) and Dixit (1987). These
10
models often arise in the context of political economy models or in the analysis of conflict and
wars.
Suppose that / players exert effort or invest in their guns or armies in order to win a contest
or fight. Again denoting the strategy (corresponding to effort or guns) by Si, player i's payoff can
be written as
TTi (Si,S-i) = Vi -. r- - Ct [Si) ,
* + ff(£j=iM*j))
where again c,. : 5, —> R+ is the cost function, hi,,.,, hi, and H are strictly increasing functions,
and R > 0. The aggregator in this case is
g(s) = H l^h^)
and reduced payoff functions can be written as
^(Si, Q) = ITi (Si, S_j) = Vi — ' - Ci(si).
it + (4
It is also useful to note that neither the model of the patent race discussed in the previous
subsection nor the more general contest models discussed here are games of strategic substitutes
(or complements). For example, suppose that h's and H are given by the identity function, so
that Q — X^7=i sj- Then, it can be verified that player i will respond to an increase in opponents'
strategies by increasing the strategy (strategic complements) if S{ > R + 5Z 7 jjSj, while she will
decrease her strategy (strategic substitutes) if S{ < R+ J2j^i sj'
3.5 Private Provision of Public Goods
Consider the public good provision model of Bergstrom et al. (1986). There are / individuals, each
making a voluntary contribution to the provision of a unique public good. Individual i maximizes
her utility function
U, I Ci^Sj + s
subject to the budget constraint Cj + ps t = m,. Here m t > is income, c, private consumption.
and s
z
is agent i's contribution to the public good, so that 5Z,=i sj +s is total amount of the public
good provided. The exogenous variable s > can be thought of as the baseline (pre-existing)
level of the public good that will be supplied without any contributions.
Substituting for c,, it is easily seen that this is an aggregative game with reduced payoff
function given by
IT Is^^s^m^p,^] =u, m t -psu ^2sj 4
11
The conditions under which this will also be a game with strategic substitutes are discussed in
Section 6.
3.6 Models with Externalities
Many models in macroeconomics, environmental economics, search theory, team theory, and other
areas feature externalities from some average of the actions of others. 10 Most generally, in these
problems the payoff of player i can be written as 7Tj (su g (s)) for some aggregator g (s). Naturally,
these games are aggregative. While some such games are also supermodular (for example, when
Si and g (s) are "complements"), this is generally not the case. For example, we can think of
a situation in which s t corresponds to research effort. Over a certain range, research by others
increases the knowledge available to all researchers, so that strategies are complements. However,
over a certain other range, various researchers might be competing against each other, so that
strategies become substitutes. It is also possible that there might be different types of researchers,
such that some of them are "imitators," who benefit from aggregate research, g (s), while others
are "innovators," who are, directly or indirectly, harmed by an increase in g(s).
4 Aggregative Games with Strategic Substitutes
We first present comparative static results for aggregative games with strategic substitutes (de-
fined in Section 2). 11 Recall that strategy sets are not one-dimensional, but throughout this
section we assume that the aggregate is one-dimensional (i.e., in terms of Definition 1, K = 1 and
N is arbitrary). In addition, recall also from Section 2 that throughout payoff functions are upper
semi-continuous and strategy sets are compact—but no quasi-concavity or convexity conditions
are imposed. The main result of this section is that "regular" comparative statics can be obtained
in such games under no additional assumptions. We begin by noting the following:
Theorem 1 (Existence) Let T be an aggregative game with strategic substitutes. Then T has a
Nash equilibrium (i.e., it has at least one pure-strategy Nash equilibrium).
Proof. See Jensen (2007).
10
See, for example. Diamond (1982) for an early example in the context of search externalities and Cooper and
John (1988) for a discussion of a range of macroeconomic models with such externalities.
u Note that instead of Definition 3 (superrnodularity and decreasing differences), we could equivalently work with
quasi-supermodularity and the duai single-crossing property of Milgrom and Shannon (1994). In fact our results
will be valid under any set of assumptions that ensure that best-response correspondences are decreasing in the
strong set order (e.g., Topkis (1998)). Quasi-supermodularity and dual single-crossing are ordinal conditions and
so hold independently of any strictly increasing transformations of the payoff functions. In particular, a payoff
function 7ri(s,,S-,, t) satisfies the dual single-crossing property in s, and S-i if for all s^ > s, and s'_, < s_,, (i)
7ri(s'i,s- t ) > m(si,S-i) =*• 7r,(s^, s'_,) > 7rj(si,s'_i), and (ii) m(s'i,s-i) > ir,(Ji. s -i) =*• 7rt(Si,s_ 1 ) > Wi(si,sLi).
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Pure-strategy equilibria are not necessarily unique. In general there will be a (compact) set
E(t) C S of equilibria for each parameter t e T. When there are multiple equilibria, we focus
on the equilibria with the smallest and largest aggregates. The smallest and largest equilibrium
aggregates are defined as
QM) = min g(s). (5)
seE(t)
Q*{i) = max g{s), and (6)
se£(()
The following theorem establishes certain important properties of the smallest and largest
aggregates, which will be used in the subsequent results.
Theorem 2 (Smallest and Largest Aggregates) For all t £ T, Q*(t) and Q*(t) are well
defined (i.e., smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates exist). Furthermore the function Q r :
T —» K is lower semi-continuous, the function Q* : T —> R is upper semi-continuous, and thus
when there is a unique equilibrium aggregate for all t, Q*{t) — Q*(t) is continuous on T.
Proof. See Section 11.1.
Our first substantive result, presented next, addresses the situation where an exogenous pa-
rameter teTCK "hits the aggregator," meaning that it only affects the function g. This result
is both of substantive interest and also enables us to prove the subsequent characterization results
(in Theorems 4 and 5). More formally, we refer to parameter t as a shock to the aggregator (or
aggregate) when we can write Hi(.Si,G(g (s) , t)) = ni(s,t) all i, where g : S —» R designates the
aggregator, and G(g(s),t) is continuous, increasing, and separable in s and t (see Definition 1 for
the relevant definition of separability). The simplest case would be when the aggregator is linear,
so that n, (si, t + £j=1 .sj) = 7Ti(.s, t) with G(g (s) ,t) = t + £J=1 8j and g (s) = EJ=i *j- Ex-
amples of shocks to the aggregator include a shift in the inverse demand function in the Cournot
model (Section 3.1), a change in the discount factor R in a patent race (Section 3.3), or a change
in the baseline provision level of the public good s in the public good provision model (Section
3.5).
Notice that when t is a shock to the aggregator and t is increased, the marginal payoff of
each player decreases (provided that marginal payoffs are defined). 12 Hence we would intuitively
expect an increasing shock to the aggregator to lead to a decrease in the aggregate. The next
theorem shows that this is indeed the case.
12By strategic substitutes, agent i's marginal payoff must be decreasing in opponents' strategies and hence, since
G is increasing in s and t, an increase in t must lead to a decrease in marginal payoff.
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Theorem 3 (Shocks to the Aggregator) Consider a shock t G T C RM to the aggregator
in an aggregative game with strategic substitutes. Then an increase in t leads to a decrease in
the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates, i.e., the functions Q*(t) and Q*(t) are (globally)
decreasing in t.
Proof. See Section 11.2.
Though the result in Theorem 3 is intuitive, we have already seen in Example 1 in the Intro-
duction that such results need not hold in simple games, even in simple aggregative games. In
Section 6.3 we present an example of a game with strategic substitutes where a shock leads to a
counter-intuitive equilibrium change in the aggregate.
The proof of the theorem exploits the constructive proof of existence of Novshek (1985) (suit-
ably generalized to fit the present framework). This approach provides an explicit description of
the largest (and smallest) equilibrium aggregate, allowing us to determine the direction of any
change resulting from a shock to the aggregate. We should also add that this approach to com-
parative statics results is, to the best of our knowledge, new. A major advantage of this approach
is that it provides global results that are valid independently of any differentiability and convexity
assumptions.
Theorem 3 also allows us to derive a general result on the effect of "entry", i.e., enables a
comparison of equilibria when an extra player is added to the game. The entrant, player 7+1
when the original game has I players, is (by definition) assigned the "inaction" strategy minS/+ i
before entry (e.g., when Sj+\ = [0, s], inaction corresponds to "zero", sj+ \ = 0; for instance,
zero production or zero contribution to the provision of a public good). Define the aggregator as
g(s) = g(si, . . . ,sj, sj+ i). Then we have a well-defined aggregative game both before and after
entry; before entry there are I players and sj+i is just a constant, after entry this is an I + 1
player aggregative game in the usual sense. As elsewhere, here increasing means "either strictly
increasing or constant". Thus the entrant may choose "inaction" (zero production in the Cournot
model, say) and thus the equilibrium after entry may remain the same. 13
Theorem 4 (Entry) In an aggregative game with strategic substitutes, entry of an additional
player will lead to a decrease in the smallest and largest aggregates of the existing players in
equilibrium (and a strict decrease if the aggregator g is strictly increasing and the entrant does
not choose inaction after entry).
Proof. This result follows from Theorem 3 by observing that the entry of an additional player
corresponds to an increasing shock to the aggregate of the existing players. In particular, let
13To strengthen the results to "strictly increasing," one could impose additional boundary conditions.
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g(s\, . .
.
, sj,si+i) be the aggregator where 7+1 is the entrant. Since g is separable, we necessarily
have g(s\, . .
.
,
sj, s/+i) = H(g(s\, . .
.
, sj), s/+i) where H and g satisfy the above requirements for
a shock to the aggregate (see, for example, Vind and Grodal (2003)).
Note that Theorem 4 only shows that the aggregates of the existing players decrease. 14 It is
intuitive to expect that the aggregate inclusive of the entrant should increase. Nevertheless, this
is not true without imposing further assumptions (see Remark 9 in the proof of Theorem 3 for a
detailed description of when entry will decrease the aggregate). In the next section, we will show
that, under additional assumptions, entry can also be shown to increase the overall aggregate (see
Theorem 8).
The next theorem presents our most powerful results for games with strategic substitutes.
These can be viewed as the strategic substitutes counterparts of the monotonicity results that are
well-known for supermodular games. One difference, however, is that with strategic substitutes,
the results apply only when shocks are idiosyncratic, i.e., to shocks t{ that affect only a single
player, i £ I. More formally, a change in U is an idiosyncratic shock to player i if payoff functions
can be written as
n(s,ti) = Ui(si,g(s),ti), and
7Tj(s,ij) = Uj(sj,g(s)) for all j jt i.
Let us also introduce the notion of a positive shock.
Definition 5 (Positive Shock) Consider the payoff function in = ni(si,s-i,ti). Then an in-
crease in ti is a positive shock ifni exhibits increasing differences in Sj and t.
It is straightforward to verify that Definition 5 gives the correct notion of "positive shock";
Ki exhibits increasing differences if only if player i's "marginal payoff', 7r;(s£, s_i, t) - 7r,;(s,, s_j, t)
for s'i > Si, is increasing in t. Moreover, as is well known, when -n^ is sufficiently smooth, it
will exhibit increasing differences in s, and t if and only if the cross-partial is nonnegative, i.e.,
Dg
t
ir > for all s and t. The single-crossing property may replace increasing differences in
the previous definition without changing any of our results. We also define smallest and largest
equilibrium strategies for player i analogously to the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates.
Theorem 5 (Idiosyncratic Shocks) Let ti be a positive idiosyncratic shock to player i. Then
an increase in ti leads to an increase in the smallest and largest equilibrium strategies for player
14This is the reason why we do not explicitly write Q'(t) and Q»(t). Instead, we could have defined Q*(t) =
max( si S( ) 6 b(() j(si s;) and Q,(t) = min (si si)eB(t) 9{si, ,si), and the statement would be for Q'{t)
and Q.(t). But this additional notation is not necessary for the statement or the proof of the theorem.
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i, and to a decrease in the associated aggregates of the remaining players (which are, respectively,
the largest and smallest such aggregates).
Proof. See Section 11.3.
A simple corollary to Theorem 5 also characterizes the effects of a positive shock on payoffs.
Corollary 1 (Payoff Effects) Assume in addition to the conditions of Theorem 5 that all payoff
functions are decreasing [respectively, increasing] in opponents ' strategies and that player i 's payoff
function is increasing [respectively, decreasing] in the idiosyncratic shock tj. Then an increase in
ti increases [respectively, decreases] player i 's payoff in equilibrium and decrease [respectively,
increases] the payoff of at least one other player.
Proof. For player i, 7Ti(s^, g(s'), t') < ni(s'
i
,g(s'
i
,s'[_
i
,t") < 7Ti(s",g(s"),t"). Since the strategy of
some player j (for j ^ i) decreases, we must have ^2k-tj hk{s'k ) < Hfc^i ^fc( sl-)- Consequently,
TT5 {s'^g{s")) < Tr^, g{s';,s'_ 3 )) < ir^gW). m
5 Nice Aggregative Games
We now extend the framework of the previous section to aggregative games without strategic
substitutes. For this purpose, we focus on "nice" games where payoff functions are differentiable
and concave (or pseudo-concave) in own strategies. 15 We also impose an additional local solvability
condition. As in the previous section, we focus on games where the aggregator is real valued (i.e.,
K = 1 in terms of Definition 1).
The following definition introduces the notion of "nice" aggregative games formally. Although
we include a boundary condition as part of this definition, when strategy sets are one-dimensional
this can be replaced by a weaker "regularity" condition (see Definition 8).
Definition 6 (Nice Aggregative Games) An aggregative game T is said to be a nice aggrega-
tive game if the aggregator g is twice continuously differentiable, each strategy set is compact and
convex, and every payoff function ni is twice continuously differentiable, and pseudo-concave in
the player's own strategies. Furthermore, we have that whenever Si £ dS% (with dSz denoting the
boundary of the strategy set Si) and (v — Si)TDSl iXi(s, t) < for all v £ Si, then DSi nz (s, t) = 0.
That is, the first- order conditions D St ni(s, t) = are required to hold whenever a boundary strategy
for player i is a (local) best response.
15Weinstein and Yildiz (2008) use a similar definition of a "nice game," except that they also impose one-
dimensional strategies and concavity (rather than pseudo-concavity).
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Remark 3 (Pseudo- concavity) Recall that a differentiable function iTi is pseudo-concave (Man-
gasarian (1965)) in S* if for all Si, s't £ Sl :
{s'i - S l )
TDSt TTl {s i .S- l ,t) < => 7Tj(s-,S_j,t) < 7rj(Sj,S_i,i).
Naturally, any concave function is pseudo-concave. Pseudo-concavity implies that the first-order
conditions DSi nl (s,t) = are sufficient for s t to maximize 7Tj given s_i and L That first-order
conditions are sufficient for a maximum is what we use in the proofs. Pseudo-concavity is not a
necessary condition for this to hold. For example, if TV = 1 and DSi iTi(s, t) = => D^ s .7Tj(s, t) < 0,
it is easy to see that the first-order condition will be sufficient for a maximum (and in fact, that
the maximum will be unique). Quasi-concavity (or even strict quasi-concavity) does not imply
the sufficiency of first-order conditions for a maximum in general.
Remark 4 (Inada-Type Boundary Conditions) Note also that the boundary condition in
Definition 6 does not rule out best responses on the boundary of a player's strategy set, dSi-
Instead, it simply requires first-order conditions to be satisfied whenever a local best response
is on the boundary. Consequently, this boundary condition is weaker than the standard "Inada-
type" conditions ensuring that best responses always lie in the interior of strategy sets (since when
best responses never lie on the boundary, first-order conditions vacuously hold for best responses
on the boundary). 16
As is well-known, the concavity or pseudo-concavity conditions ensure that best response
correspondences are convex valued (they are also upper hemi-continuous as mentioned at the
beginning of Section 2). The existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium therefore follows by
Kakutani's fixed point theorem. 17 For the record, we note this result in the following theorem
(proof omitted).
Theorem 6 (Existence) Suppose that T is a nice aggregative game. Then T has a (pure-
strategy) Nash equilibrium.
16However, all boundary conditions cannot be dispensed with. To see this, consider an iV-dimensional game,
TV > 1 (with each player having TV-dimensional strategy sets) without any interior best responses. The boundary
of this Ar-dimensional game can then be mapped bijectively into an N - 1-dimensional game. But since first-order
conditions never have to hold in the TV-dimensional game, the local solvability condition below (Definition 7) would
never have to hold. In effect, the A' — 1-dimensional "reduction" is therefore unrestricted and consequently, no
general results can be derived for such a game.
17Without convex best response correspondences, a Nash equilibrium may fail to exist in an aggregative game
(unless the game also features strategic substitutes or complements). See Jensen (2007). Example 5 for an example
of an aggregative game where a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium fails to exist even though strategy sets are one-
dimensional, convex, and there are only two players.
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A nice aggregative game does not necessarily have a unique equilibrium. Similarly, the local
solvability condition introduced below does not guarantee uniqueness. We therefore deal with the
possible multiplicity of equilibria as in the previous section and study the behavior of the smallest
and largest equilibrium aggregates, Q,(t) and Q*(t). Theorem 2 from the previous section still
applies and the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates continue to exist and are, respectively,
lower and upper semi-continuous, in t.
We next introduce the local solvability condition, which will play a central role in our anal-
ysis in this section. Let us simplify notation by defining D\Yli(si,Q,t) = JDSiIL,(sj,Q, i) and
DoU-iisi, Q, t) = DQUi(si, Q, t). Using the fact that g is a twice continuously differentiate aggre-
gator, the marginal payoff for player i can be expressed as:
D^is^t) = D 1n i (s ll g(s),t) + D 2n i (s l ,g{s),t)fl {s l ,g{s)). (7)
Where fi{si,g{s)) = DSi g(s) (cf. Remark 1).
Equation (7) shows that the marginal payoff is a function of the player's own strategy S{ and
the aggregate g{s). Let us also define a function ^, : SixRxT —> RN that makes this dependence
explicit:
9i(8i, Q, t) = DiUiisi, Q, t) + D2Ik{si,Q, t)fi{Si , Q). (8)
Note that this function contains the same information as (7), though it also enables us to
separate the direct and indirect effects of s t (the first one corresponding to a change in ^ holding
Q constant). Naturally,
<&i(sh Q) = 0^ [DSi TTi{s, = and g(s) = Q].
Differentiating $! l with respect to s, yields an N x N matrix DSt ^i(s l ,Q,t) e RNxN . The
determinant of this matrix is denoted by \DSi $>i(si,Q,t)\ G E. If strategy sets are one-dimensional,
\DSi ^i(si, Q, 0| = DMsi,Q,t)eR.
We now introduce a key concept for the study of comparative statics of nice games.
Definition 7 (Local Solvability) Player i G I is said to satisfy the local solvability condition
if \D3 .^i(si, Q,t)\^0 whenever * t (s,, Q,t)=0 (for Sl G Sit Q G {g(s) : s G S}).
The local solvability condition requires that the determinant of DSt^ is nonzero on the sub-
space where \Pj = 0. The term refers to the fact that if this determinant were equal to zero, there
would not be a unique solution to a set of equations of the form Z?Si 5' l • a = b (again defined on
the subspace where $, = 0), where a and b are TV-dimensional vectors. This type of equation
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arises when constructing the backward reply correspondences for the purposes of comparative
static analysis. This discussion also motivates the term "local solvability condition"
.
We may now also state a weaker boundary condition that can replace, when N = 1, the one
in Definition 6.
Definition 8 (Regularity) For N = 1 we say that ^i is regular if, for any t G T, there does
not exist a Q e X such that DSi ^ l (s l , Q, t) > for all s, e {s, : * l (s l , Q, t) = 0}.
Given the relationship between ^i and DSi iXi in (8), DSi ^i > on the subspace where VE', =
can be viewed as "perverse". The regularity conditions in Definition 8 rules out such perverse
cases and is straightforward to check.
Remark 5 (Ordinality) It also useful to note that local solvability condition is ordinal: it is
independent of the choice of the coordinate system and holds for any strictly increasing transfor-
mation of the aggregator. Firstly, local solvability holds for the payoff function 7Tj(s, t) if and only
if it holds for $(7r,(s, t)) where $ : M —> K is any strictly increasing and twice continuously differ-
entiable function, with derivative denoted by $' (where differentiability is needed here to ensure
that the transformed payoff function is also twice continuously differentiable). In particular, for
all s- and Q'
,
we have that
$i(4Q', t) = & $'(n,-( Si) Q, t))Vi{Si , Q, t) = 0.
Ordinality of the local solvability condition follows if |DBi ^(Sj, Q')\ ^ implies
\D s,[&{Il i {s'i ,Q
,
,t))V i {s'i ,Q',t)]\ + 0. This is true since, when *,(^,Q',i) = 0,
|^[$'(IIi (a'f) Q/ 1 t))*i(5i,Q, ,t)]|==,*'(IIiW,g',t))l^i *i(s{ ) Q')|.
Secondly, the local solvability condition is also independent of the coordinate system. In
particular, we can replace each strategy vector s, by transformed variable vector s % = ,4>l {si)
where ipi : RN —> R is a diffeomorphism for each i. The payoff function of player i then becomes
'Ki( 1P^
1
{si)i4'Zl{s-i)it), where ipz} = {'<l'7
1
)j^i- It can be verified that 7r, satisfies the local
solvability condition in s (in the original variables) if and only if the same condition is satisfied
for any such (smooth) change of variables. In particular, local solvability in the new coordinate
system requires
Z^- 1^)*^- 1 ^)^) = =» \DSi \Dip; l(^ l (v- 1 (s l )-Q)}\ ± 0.
Since Dxp-' 1 (s l )^ l (^'l {s l ), Q) = <=> *,• (i>~ 1 (.§,), Q) = {Dip; 1 ^) is a full rank matrix), we
have that
19
This establishes the desired result.
That local solvability is independent of any strictly increasing transformation of the aggregator
implies that instead of the aggregator g(s) we may use any aggregator g(s) = f{g{s)) where
/ : E —> R is a strictly increasing and differentiable function. To see this simply note that
Ui{si,g{s)) = Ui{siJ- l {g{s))) where g{s) = f(g(s)). Denoting the new aggregate by Q = g(s),
it is clear that $i(si,Q) = $i(si,Q). Evidently then \DSi ^i(si,Q)\ = |Z?Sl * l (s l , Q)\ and the
conclusion follows.
Remark 6 (Weaker Conditions) Some version of the local solvability condition cannot be
dispensed with. Example 1 in the Introduction shows the possibility of perverse comparative
statics when the local solvability condition does not hold (see also Section 6.3). Nevertheless,
the results presented in this section continue to hold under weaker conditions. In particular, the
following generalization would be sufficient, though the condition in Definition 7 is easier to state
and verify. The alternative condition is as follows: when &i[si,Q, t) = 0, there should be open
neighborhoods J\fs , and A4q of Sj and Q, respectively, and a continuous map fy : AAq —» J\fSi
such that for each Q e Mq, b l {Q) is the unique solution to <i' l (.Si 1 Q,t) = in J\fSi . This implies
that that the first-order condition $i(si,Q, t) = admits a local solution in Si as a function of
Q. Naturally, in view of the implicit function theorem, this weaker condition follows from our
local solvability condition in Definition 7. Other alternatives to the local solvability condition are
discussed in Section 8.
We next introduce the appropriate notion of positive shocks for nice games. This generalizes
the notion of a positive shock introduced in Definition 5. Because the aggregator is separable it
can be written as g(s) = H (Xw=i ^j( sj) ) where hi : Si —* M. and H : M. —* M (cf. Definition 1).
It is clear that the term hi(si) fully "captures" agent i's effect on the aggregate. Intuitively, our
generalized definition of a positive shock requires that an increase in the exogenous variable leads
to an increase in the term hi(si) and thus increases the aggregate given everyone else's strategies.
In comparison, our previous definition, Definition 5, made the stronger requirement that a player's
(smallest and largest) strategy should increase with the exogenous variable.
Definition 9 (Positive Shocks) A change in the parameter vector t is a positive shock to
player i if the largest and smallest selections from this player's "composite" best responds corre-
spondence /if(Ri(s_,, t)) are increasing in t. That is, consider t < t! 6 T and let hi o r t (s-i, t) and
hi o r .(s-j, t) be the maximal and minimal elements of ^^(/^(s-i, t)) C R. Then t is a positive
shock to player i if and only if hi ori (s- l ,t) < h l ori (s- l ,t') and h x o rj(s-j, t) < hj o rj(s_,;, t')
for all s_, G 5_j.
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Note that if a player i's strategy set is a lattice, his payoff function is supermodular in si,
and exhibits increasing differences in s; and t, then the shock will be positive. But in general, a
positive shock need not satisfy these "supermodularity" conditions. For example, a shock t is a
positive shock for a player when it does not affect the player's payoff function (regardless of any
lattice or supermodularity conditions).
Our first result in this section characterizes the comparative statics of the aggregate and
strengthens Theorem 3 from the previous section. In particular, in contrast to Theorem 3, this
results applies whether or not the shock hits the aggregate, and it also applies whether or not the
shock hits one, two, or all of the players.
Theorem 7 (Aggregate Comparative Statics) Consider a nice aggregative game where each
player's payoff function satisfies the local solvability condition. Then a positive shock t E T leads
to an increase in the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates, i.e., the functions Q*(t) and
Q*(t) are (globally) increasing in t.
The result remains valid without any boundary conditions on payoff functions when N = 1
and \l/j is regular.
Proof. See Section 11.4
Our next result extends Theorem 4 in the previous section. In particular, it strengthens
Theorem 4 to a statement for the overall aggregates (after the entry of the new additional player
instead of the aggregates of the strategies of existing players). Let us define £ Si to stand for
"inaction". As in the previous section, the convention is that / + 1th player takes this action
before entry.
Theorem 8 (Entry) Let Q*(I) and Q*{I) denote the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates
in a game with I £ N players that satisfies the conditions of Theorem 7 and where St C R^\
6S, for all i G I. Then for any I £ N, Q»(7) < Q,(I + 1) and Q*(I) < Q*{I + 1), i.e.,
entry increases the smallest and largest aggregates in equilibrium. Moreover, if the aggregator
g is strictly increasing and the entrant chooses a non-zero strategy following entry, the above
inequalities are strict.
Proof. See Section 11.5.
Finally, our third result strengthens Theorem 5 from the previous section and characterizes
the comparative statics of individual strategies. It is useful to note Theorem 9 is the first (and
only) result among those presented in this and the previous section that uses the implicit function
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theorem. As such it is a purely local result and also requires that the equilibrium strategy studied
is interior.
Theorem 9 (Individual Comparative Statics) Let the conditions of Theorem 7 be satisfied
and consider player i's equilibrium strategy s*(t) associated with the smallest (or largest) equilib-
rium aggregate at some equilibrium s* = s*(t) given t £ T. Assume that the equilibrium s* lies in
the interior of S and that t is a positive shock. Then the following results hold.
• s*(t) is (coordinatewise) locally increasing in t provided that
-[zV^OCO-Or 1*^**.^*).*) > o
• Suppose that the shock t does not directly affect player i (i.e., iTi — m(s)). Then the sign
of each element of the vector Dt s*(t) is equal to the sign of each element of the vector
-[DSi '$>i(s*,g(s*))}~ 1 DQ'fyi(s*,g(s*)). In particular, s*(t) will be (coordinatewise) locally
decreasing in t whenever:
Proof. By the implicit function theorem, we have
Ds.%(Si , Q, t)dSi = -DQ$i{si, Q, t)dQ - D2Sittti(si, Q, t)dt.
The results follow from this observation and the fact that Q increases with t (where Q is either
the smallest or largest equilibrium aggregate).
6 Applying the Theorems
In this section, we return to some of the examples presented in Section 3 and show how the results
of the last two sections can be applied to obtain sharp comparative static results. We first discuss
private provision of public goods and contests, and then turn to a game of technology choices in
an oligopolistic setting, which also illustrates how these results can be applied when strategies are
multi-dimensional.
6.1 Private Provision of Public Goods
In Bergstrom et al. (1986)'s public good provision model described in Section 3.5, agent i's reduced
utility function was given by:
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n, Si, '^Sj,m,p,s = ut m,i - psi, y^ Sj + s
As mentioned in Section 3.5, the aggregator is here simply g(s) =
^2j=i sj- When s* = (s*)i€j
is an equilibrium, we refer to g{s*) = J2i=i si as the aggregate equilibrium provision. Let us
simplify the exposition and notation here by assuming that Ui is smooth and that strategy sets
are intervals of the type Si — [0, s,] C R. The private good will be normal if and only if the
following condition holds for all s 6 5:
- pD\2ux I m % - ps^ \] sj + s 1 + D\2 Ui m-i - ps lt }] Sj; + s
J
< 0. (9)
\ ^ =i / V i=i ' /
Notice also that the left-hand side of (9) is equal to Z?^ s 11^. Therefore, whenever the private
good is normal, payoff functions exhibit decreasing differences and this is a game with strategic
substitutes (cf. Definition 3). The following result therefore follows directly from the results in
Section 4 (proof omitted):
Proposition 1 Consider the public good provision game presented in Section 3.5 and assume that
the private good is normal. Then there exists a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium. Furthermore:
1. An increase in s leads to a decrease in the smallest and largest aggregate equilibrium provi-
sions.
2. The entry of an additional agent leads to a decrease in the smallest and largest aggregate
equilibrium provisions by existing agents.
3. A positive shock to agent i will lead to an increase in that agent's smallest and largest equi-
librium provisions and to a decrease in the associated aggregate provisions of the remaining
I — I players.
Proposition 1 holds under the assumption that the private good is normal and exploits the
results from Section 4. Alternatively, we can use the results from Section 5 when the public good
is (strictly) normal. This is illustrated next. Suppose that the payoff function is pseudo-concave
(which was not assumed for Proposition 1). Then the public good will be (strictly) normal if and
only if
Ds^iist^) = p2 Diiu l (m l -psu Q) - pD2\ul(m l - psu Q) < (10)
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for all s 6 5\ 18 Moreover, whenever (10) holds, an increase in m,i (or a decrease in p) constitutes
a positive shock, i.e., D^.m Ili > and Z)^ II,- < 0, respectively (cf. Definition 9). The next
proposition then follows from Theorems 7-9 (proof omitted). 19
Proposition 2 Consider the public good provision game presented in Section 3.5 and assume that
the public good is (strictly) normal, that payofffunctions are pseudo-concave in own strategies and
that strategy sets are convex. Then there exists a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium. Furthermore:
1. Any positive shock to one or more of the agents (e.g., a decrease in p, or increases in one or
more income levels, mi,... ,mj) leads to an increase in the smallest and largest aggregate
equilibrium provisions.
2. The smallest and largest aggregate equilibrium provisions are increasing in the number of
agents.
3. The changes in 1 and 2 above are associated with an increase in the provision of agent i if
the private good is inferior for this agent, and with a decrease in agent i 's provision if the
private good is normal and the shock does not directly affect the agent.
It is also useful to note that Proposition 2 could be obtained even under weaker conditions by
using Corollary 3 presented in Section 8 below. In particular, it can be verified that if the public
good is normal (condition (10) holding as weak inequality) and payoff functions are quasi-concave
(rather than pseudo-concave), the conditions of this corollary are satisfied and Proposition 2
remains valid. We used Theorems 7-9 here since Corollary 3 is not introduced until Section 8.
6.2 Models of Contests and Fighting
Recall that the payoff function of a participant in a contest can be written as
TT, (Sj, S_,) = V
x j1—- r- - Ci (Si) , (11)
fl + ff(Ej=iM«i)
where Sj denotes agent i's effort, hi : K_|_ —> R+ for each i 6 T and H : M.+ —> M.+ . As mentioned in
Section 3.4, contests generally feature neither strategic substitutes nor complements. Therefore,
the results in Section 4 do no apply, nor do any of the well-known results on supermodular games
mentioned in the Introduction. In this case, the most obvious strategy for deriving comparative
18The equivalence between (strict) normality of the public good and (10) follows since dsi(m,,p, 53, =« Sj)/dm =
a{pDl2 u, -p2 £>iju,).
1 Note in particular that (strict) normality implies local solvability as well as regularity so the statements in
Proposition 2 are valid without any boundary conditions on payoff functions.
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static results is to use the implicit function theorem. This is indeed what most of the literature
does. Nevertheless, the implicit function theorem also runs into difficulties unless we make ad-
ditional, strong assumptions. For this reason, previous treatments have restricted attention to
special cases of the above formulation. For example, Tullock (1980) studied two-player contests,
while Loury (1979) focused on symmetric contests with (ad hoc) stability conditions. More re-
cently, Nti (1997) provided comparative statics results in the (symmetric) Loury model of patent
races, assuming that H = id (the identity function), hi — h for all i and concave, and linear costs.
Using the results of Section 5, we can establish considerably more general and robust results on
contests and fighting games.
These results are provided in the following proposition (and also generalize the existence result
of Szidarovszky and Okuguchi (1997)).
Proposition 3 Consider the contest games introduced in Section 3.4 and suppose that H is
convex, hi and Ci are strictly increasing, and that the following condition holds:
Then there exists a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium. Furthermore:
1. The smallest and largest aggregate equilibrium efforts are increasing in any positive shock
(e.g., a decrease in R or an increase in V% for one or more players).
2. Entry of an additional player increases the aggregate equilibrium effort.
3. There exists a function n : R -^>M such that the changes in parts 1 or 2 above are associated
with an increase in the effort of player i g T and the corresponding equilibrium aggregate
Q* provided that i is "dominant" in the sense that hi (s*) > n (Q*). Conversely, if i is "not
dominant", i.e., h % (s*) < n {Q*), then the changes in parts 1 and 2 decrease player i 's effort
provided that the shock does not affect this player directly (e.g., corresponding to a decrease
in another player's costs).
Proof. See Section 11.6
This proposition can also be extended to the case in which H is not convex. Convexity of
H ensures that the first-order condition DSi irl (si,S- l ) = is sufficient for a maximum, but it is
not necessary for this conclusion. Observe also that the conditions of Proposition 3 are satisfied
if H is the identity function, q is convex, and /i t is concave." Szidarovszky and Okuguchi
°The proof of Proposition 3 shows that the function rj in part 3 is given by
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(1997) prove that these conditions imply uniqueness of equilibrium provided that R = in (ll). 21
Such uniqueness is not necessary or assumed in Proposition 3. In addition, Proposition 3 also
covers important cases where hi is not concave. For example; Hirshleifer (1989) proposes the logit
specification of the contest success function, with H = id (the identity function), and hi(si) = e fc,s '
(ki > 0), and studies the special case where ki = k for all i under additional assumptions. In
this case, h'[ (si) //iJ(sj) = ki- So if, in addition, costs are also exponential, cz {si) = e liSl , the
conclusions of Proposition 3 continue to apply provided that ki <U-
6.3 Technology Choice in Oligopoly
As a final application, we consider an important class of games in which oligopoly producers make
technology choices (as well as setting output). These games were mentioned briefly in Section 3.1.
Our treatment here will also illustrate how our results with one-dimensional aggregates can be
applied when strategy sets are multi-dimensional and also clarifies how "perverse" comparative
statics may arise in such games and how it can be ruled out.
Consider a Cournot model with / heterogeneous firms. Let q = (qi, ...,qj)be the output vector
and a = (ai,...,a/) the the technology vector. Let us define Q — Yjjs=iQj as aggregate output.
Profit of firm i is
IL {qi, at, Q) = tt, (<?, a) = qtP (Q) - a {qi,a t ) - Ct (a,)
where P is the (decreasing) inverse market demand, c, is the cost of firm i is a function of its
n(Q
m
)
2H'(H- 1 (Q-)) H"{H' l (Q~))
(R + Q<) H'(H-HQ'))
Therefore, when, for example, H = h, = id (the identity function), and R = 0, we have n(Q") = Q" /2, and so
player i is "dominant" if and only if s" > Q*/2. In the standard interpretation of a contest, this means that
she is dominant when her probability of winning the prize is greater than 1/2—i.e., when she is a favorite in the
terminology of Dixit (1987). However, this favorite-to-win interpretation does not necessarily apply for more general
games covered by Proposition 3. We therefore use the term "dominant" rather than "favorite".
21 More recently, Comes and Hartley (2005) have proposed a very nice and simply proof of this result based on
what they refer as "share functions". Although Cornes and Hartley do not consider comparative statics, their "share
function" approach could be used to establish results similar to the results in Proposition 3 under these stronger
assumptions if, in addition, one also imposed that R = in (11). R = amounts to assuming no discounting in
patent races and "no wastage" in contests, and is thus quite restrictive.
When R > 0, the "share function" approach cannot be used to derive robust comparative statics. The reason
for this is that the "share function" approach uses the fact that this function is decreasing everywhere, whereas
when R > 0, it may be increasing. To see this, apply the implicit function theorem to the condition $/(si,Q) =
imposing h t {s,) = Si for all i. Rewrite this in terms of "shares", z, = Si/Q, so that [-V, — (R + Q) 2 c"]dzi =
[VRQ- 2 + (R + Qfc" + c[ Q~ 2 {2(R + Q)Q - (R + Q) 2 )]dQ. The coefficient of dz, is clearly negative. When
R = 0, the coefficient of dQ on the right-hand-side is unambigiously positive, hence dz,/dQ < 0, i.e., agent i's
share function is strictly decreasing. But in general, this may fail when R > is allowed. In particular, the term
c
'i
'
Q~ 2 {2{R + Q)Q - {R + Q) 2 ) will be positive if and only if Q > R. Clearly, nothing prevents c\ from being
sufficiently large for this term to dominate so that the share function becomes increasing when Q < R.
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quantity and technology choices, and Ci is the cost of technology adoption. Assume that P, a
and Ci (for each i) are twice differentiable, P is strictly decreasing decreasing (P' (Q) < for all
Q), Ci is convex, and dot {qi,a,i) /dqt da,i < (for each z), so that greater technology investments
reduce the marginal cost of production for each firm.
The first-order necessary conditions for profit maximization are
dlXi v'in\ , Din\ dci{qi,ai)
— = P{Q)ql + P(Q) =0
dqt oqi
dju
_
dci(qi,a,i) dCi(a,i)
_
da,i da,i dai
Naturally, we also require the second-order conditions to be satisfied, which here amount to
D\ ,7T 7; being negative semi-definite. Let us now consider the effect of a decline in the cost
of technology investment by one of the firms (i.e., a shift in Cz ), which clearly corresponds to
a positive shock. The results from Section 5 suggest that we should check the local solvability
condition. In particular, consider the matrix
D *-( p
'
{Q)
-w ~&V (q,,o t)^i- \ d2 c
,
dl c a2C
\ dq l da l ~da[ daf
for each i. When Cj (qi,a,i) is convex, the matrix
_
®2c
} _ d
2
Ci
dq; dq tda x
_
d 2 c,
_
S2 c,
dq l da i 9a 2
is negative semi-definite. Since P' (Q) < and d2Ci/daf < 0, this is sufficient to guarantee that
|-D\&i| < 0. Therefore, whenever each Cj (g,, a z ) is convex, the local solvability condition is satisfied.
Hence, a decline in the cost of technology investments for one of the firms will necessarily increase
total output. Similarly, the effects of an increase in demand on output and technology choices
can be determined robustly.
Now, the oligopoly-technology game will be a game with strategic substitutes provided merely
that d2 Ci(ql ,a,i)/dql dai < 0. 22 So when technological development lowers the marginal cost of
producing more input, which of course is perfectly reasonable to assume, the results from Section
4 apply whether or not the local solvability condition is satisfied (and whether or not payoff
functions are pseudo-concave in own strategies, etc.). In particular, an equilibrium will exist, and
any positive shock to an individual player will lead to an increase in that player's equilibrium
strategies (q*,a*) and a decrease in the aggregate of the opponents' strategies 53,-_y 9? (note here
22This condition ensures that payoff functions are supermodular in own strategies. It is easy to check that payoff
functions also exhibit decreasing differences in own and opponents' strategies.
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that the aggregator is one-dimensional, i.e., g(s) = IZjQj' so tne statement on the aggregate
of the opponents' strategies concerns only quantities). The effect of shocks to the aggregate is
determined also (Theorem 3) and so are the effect of entry (Theorem 4) and the impact on payoffs
(Corollary 1).
We next provide a specific example with strategic substitutes where the local solvability condi-
tion is violated. As will become clear, this leads to "perverse" comparative statics conclusions in
the sense that the conclusion of Theorem 7 is violated. Concretely, a positive shock to a player will
be seen to imply a decrease in the aggregate. But we repeat that the above mentioned conclusions
on, for example, individual shocks' effect on individual strategies remain valid.
45°-line
Figure 1: Backward reply correspondences Figure 2: A decrease in marginal costs for the
(dashed). Aggregate backward reply correspon- second firm leads to a decrease in aggregate out-
dence (solid). put from Q' to Q"
.
Suppose that there are only two firms and P (Q) = K — Q for some constant K > 0. Suppose
also that firm l's costs are given by Q.5qf(ai — aj) + Ci(aj) for some differentiable, strictly
increasing and strictly convex function C\. This implies that its payoff function is
7Tf(g,a) = \K-Q)qi - 0.5g?(ai - oi) -Ci(oi).
The first-order conditions for firm 1 can be written as,
K — Q — qi — q-\ (a\ — a{) = 0, and 0.5(75" = Cl( a ])-
Since C\ is strictly increasing, {C[)~ l is well-defined. {C[)~ l is strictly increasing since C\ is
strictly convex (and conversely, when (CJ) _1 is strictly increasing, C\ must be strictly convex). Let
us define G\{z) = (Cj) _1 (0.522 ) which will also be strictly increasing. Choosing G\ is equivalent
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to choosing C\. Let
Gi(qi) = — Jig? +7i 9i + 0i>
where 71, <5i > 0, and (3\ < 2, so that the best responds choice of quantity for firm 1 becomes the
solution to the following cubic equation:
K - Q + (/3i - 1 - qi) 9 i - 6iqf + liq\ = 0. (12)
Figure 1 plots q\ as a function of Q for a particular choice of parameters (the dashes "inverse-5"
shaped curve). The second dashed curve (the negatively sloped line) shows the same relationship
for firm 2 (92 as a function of Q). Concretely, firm 2's cost function is assumed to take the form:
[»2 + 0.5/3292 ~~ 72(a2)^ 2 ] + #2&2- This yields a simple linear relationship between Q and </2 :
= K — Q - iiiqi- The solid line in the figure is the aggregate backward reply correspondence
which shows q\ + 172 as & function of Q (the sum of the two dashed curves). 23
A Cournot equilibrium is given by the solid curve's intersection with the 45°-line in Figure
1. Figure 2 depicts the same aggregate backward reply correspondence as in Figure 1 (solid),
together with a similarly constructed aggregate backward reply correspondence (dashed). The
only difference between the two's parameter values is that for the dashed curve fa is lower. 24
Naturally, a reduction in fa corresponds to a reduction in the marginal cost of firm 2. The
figure shows that such a decrease in marginal costs reduces aggregate output Q. It can also be
verified for the parameters here, the two firms' payoff/profit functions are strictly concave (even
though the cost function of firm 1 is not convex). This example thus illustrates that even in
"nice" aggregative games with strategic substitutes, the local solvability condition is critical for
the conclusion of Theorem 7: Unless the shock hits the aggregate {e.g., an increase in K) so that
Theorem 3 applies, a positive shock may lead to a decrease in the equilibrium aggregate when
the local solvability condition does not hold.
7 Multidimensional Aggregates
We have so far focused on aggregative games with one-dimensional aggregates, i.e., games where
g : S —> E. Many important examples, including the Bertrand game with homogeneous products
discussed in Section 3, require more than a one-dimensional aggregate, g : S —> RM , M > 1.
Another game with multi-dimensional aggregates is the technology choice game considered in
23The specific set of parameter values yielding the configuration in Figure 1 are: K = 4, /?i — 1 — ot\ = —4.4,
71 = 2.5, <5i = 0.4, and 02 = 40. Note that given these parameter values G\ will be strictly increasing (C\ will be
strictly convex) whenever q\ < 3.125. It is also straightforward to verify that any perturbation of these parameters
leads to the same comparative static results, so that this perverse comparative static is "robust"
.
24 Concretely, 62 = 10 for the dashed curve and 02 = 40 for the solid curve.
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Section 6.3 when technology costs also depend on some aggregate of the technology choices of
other firms, e.g., C
x
— Ct (a*, A) for some aggregate of technology choices A.
In this section, we discuss how some of our results can be extended to this case. To simplify
the exposition we focus on the case where the aggregator takes the form g(s) = Ylj=i sj- 25 ^n
this case, naturally, g : S —> RN , hence M = N. We continue to assume that there are I
players and we denote the set of players by 1. In addition, we assume that the game is both
"nice" (Definition 6) and also exhibits strategic substitutes. Then, proceeding as in Section 5, we
define D\Tl l (s l ,Q,t) = DSi JJi(si, Q, t) and Z^II^Si, Q, t) = DQUi(si,Q,t). The marginal payoff
for player i can again then be expressed as:
£ s ,7rt (s, t) = DiU, Si , ]T sj, t + D2Ui sh J2 »j. l ( 13 )
Now denoting the vector of aggregates by Q = X^ 7 =i sj^ we again define:
%(su Q, t) = Dinifa Q, t) + D2Ik(si, Q, t). (14)
Parallel with the local solvability condition (Definition 7 in Section 5), we will place certain key
restrictions on the ^, functions. These restrictions, together with our focus on nice games with
strategic substitutes, are collected in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 The game F is an aggregative nice game (Definition 6) and in addition, for each
player i, we have:
• (Strategic Substitutes) Si is a compact lattice, and iXi{si, s_j, t) is super-modular in s, and
exhibits decreasing differences in Si and s3 (for all j ^ i).
• (Strong Local Solvability) Every real eigenvalue of DSi ^i \Si,Y^, 1= \ sj^) i-s negative.
Remark 7 (Strong Local Solvability) That every real eigenvalue of D Si ^/i [si,Y2, = i sj<t) ^s
negative implies that its determinant is non-zero (this is because DSi $i must have non-negative off-
diagonal elements, see the proof of Theorem 11 for further details). Consequently, local solvability
(Definition 7) is implied by strong local solvability.
Assumption 1 is straightforward to verify because of the following two relationships linking
the usual second-order matrices of 7T, and the gradient of the ^i functions:
25
All of the following results remain valid if we assume instead that g(s) = ((^(sj, . .
.
, s}), . . .
,g
N
(sj', . . . .sf))
with each function g
n
separable. See the beginning of the proof of Theorem 7 for details on how one can transform
such a game into a game with a linear aggregator.
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DiiS .TTi (s, = DiiSj Hi Si ,^ s fc , i = Z?^ Si,^ s fcl « for all j ± i, and (15)
Since by (15), Dq^i = D^iS lit for all j / i, decreasing differences (strategic substitutes)
requires simply that DqYI t (s,, 53;= i sj'0 *s a non-positive matrix. Next we can sum the two
matrices DSi ^ l and Dq <^ 1 in order to obtain Dg. s .nt (cf. (15)). Supermodularity holds if and
only if the matrix D^
s
TIj has non-negative off-diagonal entries. Finally, strong local solvability
requires that the real eigenvalues of DSi 'i/ l are negative. When DSi }i> l is symmetric (which is
often the case in practice), this is the same as £> Sl ^; being a negative definite matrix. Note also
that concavity of payoff functions in own strategies is implied by Assumption 1 (see the proof of
Theorem 11). Thus, in games with multi-dimensional aggregates the verification of strong local
solvability "replaces" the very similar task of verifying that the Hessian is negative definite. The
concavity implications of Assumption 1 also mean that when this assumption holds, the existence
of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium follows immediately by Brouwer's fixed point theorem. This
is noted in the following theorem (proof omitted):
Theorem 10 (Existence) Suppose that T satisfies Assumption 1. Then Y has a (pure-strategy)
Nash equilibrium.
We next define the backward reply function of player i again using the first-order conditions:
Si = bi(Q,t) <=> $i(si,<5) = 0. Assumption 1 simplifies matters here by ensuring that each Q
leads to a unique backward reply function (rather than a correspondence), ^(Q.t) 26 For any
given vector of aggregates Q, the gradient of b-i(Q) is also well-defined and is given by:
DQbi(Q,t) = -[DSiVi (bi{Q,t),Q,t)]- 1DQ $i(bi (Q,t),Q 1 t),
and thus
/
DQ b(Q,t) = ^DQ b] (Q,t).
3=1
26 Fixing Q, it is clear that the gradient of \Pi(-, Q), DSl 9i(si, Q) (which is a N x TV matrix), is non-singular at any
stationary point. In particular, from strong local solvability, the determinant of DSl 'i/ t (s,,Q) never changes sign and
never equals zero. This immediately implies that there exists a unique critical point (e.g., from the Poincare-Hopf
theorem; Milnor (1965)).
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Let us also recall that an M-matrix is a matrix with positive real eigenvalues and non-positive
off-diagonal entries. 27 We are then ready to state the following multi-dimensional version of
Theorems 3 and 7.
Theorem 11 (Shocks to the Aggregates) Suppose that V satisfies Assumption 1. Let tgTC
M.
N be a shock to the aggregate, that is, let TTi(s, t) = Hi ( Sj, t.+ J2j=i sj ) for °^ * e -E, and assume
that the matrix I — [Dq6(Q + t)]~ exists and is non-singular. Then:
• (Sufficency) If the matrixl- [DQb(Q + t)]~ i is an M -matrix (for allQ andt), an increase
in t £ T leads to a decrease in each component of the equilibrium aggregate vector.
• (Necessity) Conversely, let Q(t') be an equilibrium aggregate given some vector of parame-
ters t' £ T that hits the aggregate. Then if I— [DQb(Q(t') + t')}~ 1 is not an M-matrix, there
exists t" > t' such that at least one component of the equilibrium aggregate vector increases
when t is raised from t' to t"
.
Proof. See Section 11.7.
In what follows, we will use the sufficiency part of Theorem 11 to present direct parallels to
the other theorems presented in Section 4. Nevertheless, the necessity part of this theorem is also
noteworthy, perhaps even surprising.
Given Theorem 11, the proofs of the next three theorems closely follow the proofs of the
analogous theorems for the one-dimensional case and are thus are omitted. 28 For the next theorem,
suppose that the default inaction strategy of the entrant now is a vector of zeroes (or, more
generally, the least element in the entrant's strategy set).
Theorem 12 (Entry) Suppose that T satisfies Assumption 1 and the sufficiency conditions in
Theorem 11. Then entry of an additional player leads to a decrease in the aggregates of the
existing players. In addition, at least one of the aggregates of all players must increase with entry,
and strictly so unless the entrant chooses inaction.
Theorem 13 (Idiosyncratic Shocks) Suppose that T satisfies Assumption 1 and the sufficiency
conditions in Theorem 11. Then a positive idiosyncratic shock to player i E T leads to an increase
27
Recall that an M-matrix and an inverse M-matrix are also P-matrices [i.e., all of their principal minors are
positive). Moreover, if a matrix has a non-positive off-diagonal, it is an M-matrix if and only if it is also a P-matrix.
28The only new feature is the second statement of the entry theorem (that at least one of the aggregates must
increase upon entry). This is a direct consequence of the fact that the backward reply function of the existing
players, b, is decreasing (this is proved as part of Theorem 11). Indeed, let Qb be the vector of aggregates before
entry, Qa the aggregates after entry, and s/+i > be the strategy chosen by the entrant. Since b is decreasing,
Q a < Qb implies: < Qb - Qa = b{Q b ) - b(Q a ) - si+\ < --si+i which in turn implies si+i = Q b - Qa = 0.
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in this player's equilibrium strategy and to a decrease in the associated aggregates of the existing
players.
Remark 8 (Sufficient Conditions for Two-Dimensional Aggregates) When N = 2 (g :
S —> R 2 ), the sufficient conditions are particularly easy to verify. In particular, I— [Z?q&(Q + £)] _1
exists and is a non-singular M-matrix when — [Dq6(Q + t)\~ l is a non-singular M-matrix. This
is generally the case (regardless of N), since the real eigenvalues of [I — [Z?q6(Q + r)] _1 ] are equal
to (Ai + 1), . .
. ,
(Am + 1), where Ai, . .
.
, Am > are the real eigenvalues of — [Dqb(Q + t)]~ l .
In this two-dimensional case, -[Dq6(Q + f)]" 1 is a non-singular M-matrix if and only if the
determinant of Dqo(Q + t) is positive. To see this first note that since DQb(Q + t) is a non-
positive matrix, its trace is non-positive. So when the determinant is positive, both eigenvalues
must be negative (when they are real; if they are not real, then there is nothing to check because
the definition of an M-matrix above requires only that the real eigenvalues be positive). It then
follows that — [JDq6(Q + t)\~ l is a matrix with non-positive off-diagonal elements and positive
(real) eigenvalues, and thus it is a non-singular M-matrix.
Now since Dqb(Q + t) = Ylj=i ^Q^jiQ + 0> a sufficient condition for Dqb(Q + t) to have a
positive determinant is that each of the matrices DQbl (Q+t), i = 1, ... ,1 is quasi-negative definite
(xTDQbi(Q + t)x < for all x ^ 0). This is because the sum of quasi-negative definite matrices
is quasi-negative definite, and a 2 x 2 quasi-negative definite matrix has a positive determinant.
The next corollary exploits this observation.
Corollary 2 (Symmetric Games with Two-Dimensional Aggregates) Suppose that T
satisfies Assumption 1 and N = 2. Consider a shock to the aggregate. Then if the matrix
Dq^ 1 (s 1 , ^2 ,=i sj + t) has a positive determinant for all s £ S and t G T, a positive shock to
the aggregates will lead to a decrease in both of the aggregates in any symmetric equilibrium. In
addition, the results in Theorems 12-13 continue to hold when the existing players choose identical
strategies before and after entry (Theorem 12), and the players that are not affected by the shock
choose identical strategies before and after the arrival of the idiosyncratic shock (Theorem IS).
Proof. The aggregate in a symmetric equilibrium is given by Q = Ib l (Q + t) where i 6 lis
any of the (identical) players. From Theorem 11, a positive shock to the aggregate decreases the
aggregate if only if [I - [DQb(Q + i)] _1 is a non-singular A/-matrix. From Remark 8, we only need
to verify that -[DQ b(Q + t)]~ l = -[DQ bz (Q + 01
-1
/ 1 is a non-singular M-matrix. When N = 2,
this holds if and only if the determinant of DQbi(Q+ t) is positive. This is the case when Dq <S> 1 has
a positive determinant, because Ds^i has a positive determinant and Dbi = —\DSi '$> 1 }~ 1 Dq';1! 1 .
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8 Nice Games without Differentiability
In this section, we extend the results for nice games presented in Section 5. Recall that the main
assumption of Section 5, local solvability, presupposes that payoff functions and the aggregator
are twice continuously differentiable. In this section, we show that robust comparative statics can
be derived without differentiability as long as a non-differentiable version of the local solvability
condition is imposed. We limit attention to the case of one-dimensional strategy sets (hence the
aggregate must be one-dimensional also). Recall that an aggregator always has a representation
of the form g(s) = H (]Ci=i hj(sj)), where H and h\,
.
.
.
, hi are strictly increasing functions.
Therefore, for any Q in the range of g, we have Q = g(s) <=> s, = h~ l H~ 1 (Q) - J2j& ^j( sj)
Intuitively, this means that if we know the aggregate Q and the strategies of / - 1 players, we
also know the strategy of the last player. Let us also define Gi(Q, y) = h~ l [H~ 1 (Q) - y). Recall
from Milgrom and Shannon (1994) that a function f{Q,y) satisfies the single-crossing property
in (Q, y) if, for all Q' > Q and y' > y, we have
f(Q',y) > (>) f(Q,y) = f(Q\y') > (>) f(Q,y')-
The main result in this section, presented next, shows that an appropriately-chosen single-
crossing property can replace the local solvability condition (Definition 7) and thus extends our
results to nice games without differentiability.
Theorem 14 (Comparative Statics for Nice Games without Differentiability) Consider
an aggregative game with one-dimensional convex, compact strategy sets, a separable aggregator,
payoff functions that are upper semi- continuous and quasi-concave in own strategies. Suppose
that n t (G t (Q, y), Q, t) (for each i 6 T) satisfies the single-crossing property in (Q,y). Then the
conclusions of Theorems 7 and 8 continue to hold. Moreover, provided that payoff functions are
twice differentiable and the equilibrium is interior, the conclusions of Theorem. 9 also hold.
Proof. See Section 11.8.
Notice that differentiability is needed in Theorem 9 in order to even state this theorem's main
conclusions. Clearly, the more interesting part of Theorem 14 concerns Theorems 7-8.
The next corollary uses the insights of Theorem 14 to provide another useful and simple
alternative to the local solvability condition for nice games.
Corollary 3 Consider a nice aggregative game with linear aggregator g(s) = y\ Sj, one-dimensional
strategy sets (i.e., N — 1), and assume that for each player i:
DSi $?i(si,Q) <Q for all Si andQ (17)
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Then the conclusions of Theorems 7, 8, and 9 continue to hold.
Proof. Since g is linear, Gi(Q,y) = Q — y and ilj(G ;(Q , y) , Q , t) = U L (Q — y,Q,t) (for each
i e 1). The condition D5i *,(s l , Q) < is equivalent to -D s,*j = -D^TU - D^II, > for all s,
and Q. This is in turn equivalent to IT^Q - y,Q,t) exhibiting increasing differences in Q and y.
Since increasing differences implies the single-crossing property, the results follow from Theorem
14.
Note that Condition (17) in Corollary 3 requires that Ds^i(si,Q) < for all Si and Q. By
contrast, the local solvability condition requires DSi ^i(si,Q) ^ 0, but only when s, and Q are
such that $i(si,Q) = 0. Thus neither condition generalizes the other. If (17) holds with strict
inequality throughout, i.e., D^^^Sj, Q) < for all s, and Q, then local solvability would be
implied, though the weak inequality makes this condition easier to check and apply in a variety
of examples (recall the discussion in Section 6.1). 29
9 Walrasian Play
When the aggregate Q results from the "average" of the strategies of a large number of players,
it may plausible to presume that each player i e T will ignore the effect of its strategy on
the aggregate. In this case, each player ?' e 1 will maximize the reduced payoff function II, =
n i (.s l , Q, t) with respect to Si taking Q as given. This is the behavior assumed in standard general
equilibrium theory with a finite (but large) number of households. With analogy, we refer to the
situation in aggregative games where players ignore their impact on aggregates as Walrasian play
and the associated Nash equilibrium as a Walrasian Nash Equilibrium.^ For such games, our
results can be strengthened (and the proofs in fact become more straightforward). Here we briefly
outline the main results in this case, focusing on one-dimensional aggregates {i.e., K = 1).
Definition 10 (Walrasian Nash Equilibrium) Consider an aggregative game Y = ((IT, Sl ) iej, g, T).
The strategy profde s*(t) = (s\(t), . . . ,s*j(t)) is called a (pure-strategy) Walrasian Nash equilib-
rium given t <£ T if holding Q(t.) = g(s*{t)) fixed, we have for each player i = !,...,! that,
s*i(t) e IU{Q,t) = arg max 11,(5,, Q(0,0 • (18)
steS,
29
It can also be noted that (17) with strict inequality makes up "half of what Corchon (1994) calls the "strong
concavity" condition. The other "half of Corchon's strong concavity condition requires payoff functions to exhibit
strictly decreasing differences in own and opponents' strategies. This is not assumed in our analysis.
30Such "aggregate-taking" behavior has been studied extensively within evolutionary game theory, see for example
Vega-Redondo (1997), Possajennikov (2003), and Schipper (2004).
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Notice that under Walrasian play, a player's best responses i^(Q,f) will depend on the ag-
gregate Q and the exogenous variables t. An increase in Ms a positive shock for player i if the
smallest and largest selections from Ri{Q, t) are both increasing in t. The game features strategic
substitutes if each Si is a lattice, 11^ is supermodular in Si, and exhibits decreasing differences in
Si and Q. When N = 1 and Hi is twice continuously differentiable, a sufficient condition for t
to be a positive shock is that D^.
tHi(si, Q, t) > (for all Q and t), and a sufficient condition for
strategic substitutes is that D^.QlLi(si,Q,t) < (for all Q and t).
As in previous sections, we maintain the compactness and upper semi-continuity assumptions.
Also, since as before, there may be multiple equilibria, we continue to focus on the smallest and
largest equilibrium aggregates Q*{t) and Q*{t) (cf. equations (6) and (5) in Section 4).
Theorem 15 (Comparative Statics for Walrasian Nash Equilibria) Consider an aggrega-
tive r and assume that the (reduced) payoff function IIj(sj, Q,t) is quasi-concave in S{ G Si for
each i El. Then a Walrasian Nash equilibrium exists. Moreover, we have that:
1. Theorems 7, 8, and 9 hold for Walrasian Nash equilibria. In particular, a positive shock to
one or more of the agents will lead to an increase in the smallest and largest equilibrium
aggregates, and entry increases the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates. In addition,
suppose that payoff functions are smooth and the equilibrium is interior. Then for each
i £ I, s*(t) is locally coordinatewise increasing in a positive shock t provided that:
-[p^iiiWW, Q(t)\ t)]- lLiQni(8W), Q(t), t) > o,
and if Hi = Hi(si,Q) (i.e., the shock does not directly affect player i), then the sign each
element of the vector Dts*(t) is equal to the sign of each element of the vector
-{Dl SiUi (S*(t),Q(t)T 1D2SiQUi (S*(t),Q(t)).
2. IfT features strategic substitutes, then Theorems 3, 4> and 5 continue to hold for Walrasian
Nash equilibria.
Proof. (Sketch) For part 1, simply define Z(Q,t) = {g{s) G K : s, € Ri(Q,t) for all ?}. In
view of our compactness and upper semi-co'ntinuity assumptions, Z (Q, t) is a convex-valued,
upper hemi-continuous correspondence. Then we can proceed as in the proof of Theorem 7 but
using Z (Q,t) instead of the function q. Figure 10 in the Appendix makes it clear that the general
argument remains valid if instead of the function q, we use a convex-valued correspondence. Given
this result, the proofs of Theorems 8, and 9 apply with minimal modifications.
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For part 2, note that a shock to the aggregate is a negative shock (by decreasing differences
in s, and Q), hence it leads to a decrease in the smallest and largest aggregates by the conclusion
from part 1. The conclusions of Theorems 4 and 5 are established by straightforward modifications
of the original proofs.
A noteworthy implication of Theorem 15 is that all our results for nice aggregate games con-
tinue hold for a Walrasian Nash equilibria without imposing local solvability or differentiability
and boundary conditions (only quasi-concavity is imposed to ensure that best response corre-
spondences are convex-valued). This highlights that the challenge in deriving robust comparative
static results in aggregative games lies in limiting the magnitude of the effect of own strategies
on the aggregate. It should also be noted that part 2 of the theorem is false if payoff functions
are not assumed to be quasi-concave, though the results do hold if the game instead features
strict strategic substitutes (i.e., if strictly decreasing differences is assumed instead of decreasing
differences in Definition 3). 31 The proof of Theorem 15 also shows that any separability assump-
tions on the aggregator g are unnecessary: the conclusions hold provided that g is an increasing
function (without further restrictions).
10 Conclusion
This paper presented robust comparative static results for aggregative games and showed how
these results can bo applied in several diverse settings. In aggregative games, each player's payoff
depends on her own actions and on an aggregate of the actions of all players (for example,
sum, product or some moment of the distribution of actions). Many common games in industrial
organization, political economy, public economics, and macroeconomics can be cast as aggregative
games. Our results focused on the effects of changes in various parameters on the aggregates of
the game. In most of these situations the behavior of the aggregate is of interest both directly
and also indirectly, because the comparative statics of the actions of each player can be obtained
as a function of the aggregate. For example, in the context of a Cournot model, our results
characterize the behavior of aggregate output, and given the response of the aggregate to a shock,
one can then characterize the response of the output of each firm in the industry.
We focused on two classes of aggregative games: (1) aggregative of games with strategic
substitutes and (2) "nice" aggregative games, where payoff functions are twice continuously dif-
ferentiable, and (pseudo-)concave in own strategies. For example, for aggregative games with
strategic substitutes, we showed that:
31 However, an equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in this case because of lack of quasi-concavity. To apply the
result mentioned in the text one must thus first (directly) establish the existence of an equilibrium.
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1. Changes in parameters that only affect the aggregate always lead to an increase in the
aggregate (in the sense that the smallest and the largest elements of the set of equilibrium
aggregates increase).
2. Entry of an additional player decreases the (appropriately-defined) aggregate of the strate-
gies of existing players.
3. A "positive" idiosyncratic shock, defined as a parameter change that increases the marginal
payoff of a single player, leads to an increase in that player's strategy and a decrease in the
aggregate of other players' strategies.
We provided parallel, and somewhat stronger, results for nice games under a local solvability
condition (and showed that such results do not necessarily apply without this local solvability
condition).
The framework developed in this paper can be applied to a variety of settings to obtain
"robust" comparative static results that hold without specific parametric assumptions. In such
applications, our approach often allows considerable strengthening of existing results and also
clarifies the role of various assumptions used in previous analyses. We illustrated how these results
can be applied and yield sharp results using several examples, including public good provision
games, contests, and oligopoly games with technology choice.
Our results on games with multi-dimensional aggregates (Section 7) are only a first step in this
direction and our approach in this paper can be used to obtain additional characterization results
for such games. We leave a more systematic study of games with multi-dimensional aggregates
to future work. We also conjecture that the results presented in this paper can be generalized to
games with infinitely many players and with infinite-dimensional strategy sets. In particular, with
the appropriate definition of a general aggregator for a game with infinitely many players (e.g.,
along the lines of the separability definitions in Vind and Grodal (2003), Ch. 12-13), our main
results and in fact even our proofs remain valid in this case. Similarly, with the appropriate local
solvability condition in infinite dimension, all of our results also appear to generalize to games with
infinite-dimensional strategy sets. The extension of these results to infinite-dimensional games is
another area for future work.
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11 Appendix: Proofs
11.1 Proof of Theorem 2
For each player i, define the correspondence GrfA,] : T —> 2s by,
Gr[Ri](t) = {seS-. Sl e Ri(s-U t)} ,teT
This correspondence is upper hemi-continuous and has a closed graph: if s™ G Rl (s r^l ,tm )
for a convergent sequence (sm ,tm ) —> (s,t), then by the fact that R^ itself has a closed graph.
Si £ Ri(s-i, t). Moreover, E(t) = DiGr[/i']. The correspondence E : T —> 2s is thus given by the
intersection of a finite number of upper hemi-continuous correspondences, and so is itself upper
hemi-continuous. In particular, E has compact values {E(t) C 5, where 5 is compact). Therefore,
the existence of the smallest and largest equilibrium aggregates, Q*{t) and Q*{t), follows from
the continuity of g and from Weierstrass' theorem. Upper semi-continuity of Q* : T —> R follows
directly from the fact that g is upper semi-continuous and E is upper hemi-continuous (see
Ausubel and Deneckere (1993), Theorem 1). Lower semi-continuity of Q* follows by the same
argument since Q*(t) = — maxs€E^ —g(s) and g is also lower semi-continuous. Finally, when
the equilibrium aggregate is unique for all t, Q*(t) = Q*{t) and so is both upper and lower
semi-continuous and thus continuous in t on T.
11.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Recall that 7Tj(s, t) = IT(si, G(g (s) , t)) all i, where g : S —> R is separable in s and G(g (s) , t) is
separable in (s,t). This implies that,
G(g(s),t) = H
where g (s) = M (X^gz ^ ( s i)) ls the aggregator of Definition 1, and M is a strictly increasing
function. Moreover, recall that best response correspondence Ri (s_j, t) is upper hemi-continuous
for each i 6 J. Let h l (Sl ) be the image of the strategy set 5j under /i t (•) and define the "reduced"
best response correspondence R^ I hx{t) + ]Cir# hjisj) ) = ^( s -?i f°r eacn *• We can then define
the following upper hemi-continuous (possibly empty-valued) correspondence:
Bt (Q, t) = [i] G hi(Si) : r? e hi o Ri(hT {t) + Q-77)}
for each plaver i. Let
/
Z(Q,t) = Y^B: (Qj)
j=i
be the aggregate backward reply correspondence associated with the aggregate Q — Yli hj(sj).
Clearly, the "true" aggregate g (s) = M I J3 hj(sj) ) is monotonically increasing in the aggregate
Q = ^2j hj(sj). Therefore, we may without loss of generality focus on J2j ^-j( sj) instead of g(s)
in the following.
Let q(Q, t) G Z(Q, f) be the aggregate "Novshek-selection" shown as the thick segments in the
figure below.
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Figure 3: Constructing the aggregate "Novshek-selection"
A sketch of how this selection is constructed follows. 32 The first step is to pick Qmax > 0,
such that q < Qmax for all q 6 Z(Qmax ,t). To ensure that such a "point below the diagonal"
exists, we can extend each of the correspondences hi o R^ along the lines of Kukushkin (1994) (see
p. 24, 1.18-20). The details of this procedure need to be modified as follows. Let Di denote the
subset of R upon which h % o R4 is defined, i.e., write 7 G Dj if and only if hi 0/^(7) ^ 0. Since
hi o Ri is upper hemi-continuous, D{ is closed. It is also a bounded set since R4 C 5, and each
5j is compact. Consequently, D t has a maximum, which we denoted by di. Then extend hi o R^
from A to A U {di,Qmax ] by taking fo o Rd (d) = _L( all a! G (a(2 ,Qmo:r ]. Here 1, can be any
small enough element (for each player iel) such that Y^i -Li < Qmax , J-i < min /i, o Rt (di), andQmax
_ j_ i g
^^QTTiaij^ Defining the aggregate backward reply correspondence Z as above, it is
clear that Z(Qmax
,
t) = £ t ± t < Qmax .
Next let D C (-00, Q""1*] denote the subset of R, where Z(-, t) is defined, i.e., those Q < Qmax
for which Bi(Q, t) 7^ 0, all i, The set D is compact by the same argument as in the previous
paragraph. Now, abusing notation slightly, let us denote a closed "interval" in D by [Q 1,Qmax ].
That is, \Q',Qmax ] = D n {Q : Q 1 < Q < Qmax }. Given such an interval [Q',Qmax ], we say
that a function q : [Q\ Qmax ] x {t} —> R is a maximal decreasing selection (from Z) if for all
Q G [Q', gmaa: ], the following are true: (i) q(Q, t) > Z for all Z G Z(Q, t) (c 2R ); (ii) q{Q, t) < Q;
and (iii) the backward reply selections bi(Q,t) G Bi(Q,t) associated with q (i.e., backward by
selections satisfying q(Q, t) = V bj(Q, t) all Q) are all decreasing in Q on \Q' , Qmax ] (i.e., Q" > Q'
=>bi(Q",t)<bi(Q',t)).
Denote by ft. C 2R the set of all "intervals" \Q'
, Qmax \ upon which a maximal decreasing
selection exists. Notice that {Qmax } G fi so f2 is not empty. f7 is ordered by inclusion since for
any two elements u>',w" in Q, w" = [<?", Qmai ] C [Q',QmQ:r ] = a/ «=> Q" < Q'. A chain in SI is a
totally ordered subset (under inclusion). It follows directly from the upper hemi-continuity of the
backward reply correspondences that any such chain with an upper bound has a supremum in fl
(i.e., O contains an "interval" that contains each "interval" in the chain). Zorn's Lemma therefore
implies that Q. contains a maximal element, i.e., there exists an interval [Q
mm
,
Q
max
] G f2 that is
not (properly) contained in any other "interval" from fl.
The "Novshek-selection" is the maximal decreasing selection described above and defined on
the interval [Qmin,Qmax ]. See the figure.
The main step in proving the existence of equilibrium consists in showing that Qmm is an
equilibrium aggregate (it is easy to see that if Qmin is an equilibrium aggregate, then the associated
backward replies form an equilibrium). Since we have q(Qmin , t) < Qmin by construction, this
can be proved by showing that q(Qmin ,t) < Qmin cannot happen. This step is completed by
showing that if q(Qmin , t) < Qmin holds, then q can be further extended "to the left" (and the
32The construction here is slightly different from the original one in Novshek (1985), but the basic intuition is
the same. Aside from being somewhat briefer, the present way of constructing the "Novshek-selection" does not
suffer from the "countability problem" in Novshek's proof pointed out by Kukushkin (1994), since we use Zorn's
Lemma for the selection.
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extension will satisfy (i)-(iii) above). This would violate the conclusion of Zorn's Lemma that
jQnnn^ Qmaxj
js maximal, thus leading to a contradiction. The details of this step are identical to
those in Novshek (1985) and are omitted.
Note that since hx is an increasing function, q{Q, t) will be locally decreasing in Q if and only
if it is locally decreasing in t (the effect of an increase in t or Q enter qualitatively in the same way
in the definition of Bi, and so the effect of an increase on q must be of the same sign). Figures
4-7 illustrate the situation for t' < t" . The fact that the direction of the effect of a change in Q
and t is the same accounts for the arrows drawn. In particular, any increasing segment will be
shifted up and any decreasing segment will be shifted down because the shock hits the aggregate
(this feature does not necessarily hold for other types of shocks).
Z(QJ) (" (
Q
Z(Q,t) rf
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Figure 4: Case I Figure 5: Case II
Figure 6: Case III Figure 7: Case IV
There are four cases: Either the equilibrium aggregate varies continuously with t, and q is
decreasing (Case I) or increasing (Case II). Otherwise, the equilibrium aggregate "jumps" when t
is increased (Cases III and IV). [The figures depict the situations where the equilibrium aggregate
jumps from Q' to Q"
.
This is associated with an increase in t. If instead t decreases, case III
reduces to Case I and Case IV reduces to Case II.]
Importantly, if the equilibrium aggregate jumps, it necessarily jumps down (and so is decreas-
ing in t). The reason is that an increase in t will always correspond to the graph of q being shifted
to "the left'
-
(that is another way of saying that any increasing segment will be shifted up, and
any decreasing segment shifted down). Hence no new equilibrium above the original largest one
can appear, the jump has to be to a lower equilibrium. See the figures. We now consider Cases I
and II in turn.
Case I: In this case we have Q < Q such that q(Q, t) — Q > and q(Q, t) — Q < 0, and such that
the new equilibrium aggregate Q" lies in the interval [Q, Q\. Since q is decreasing in t, it trivially
follows that Q" < Q'. Note that this observation does not depend on continuity of q in Q, but
merely on the fact that a new equilibrium aggregate Q" exists and lies in the neighborhood of Q'
where q is decreasing (in other words, it depends on the fact that the aggregate does not "jump").
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Figure 8: Slope below 1 is impossible: Q' be-
ing largest equilibrium aggregate violates that
q{Q, t) is decreasing in Q.
Figure 9: The "Novshek selection"
leading to the smallest equilibrium ag-
gregate.
Case II: As in Case I, we have Q" £ [Q. Q]. When q is (locally) increasing, we must have Q < Q
such that Q — q(Q, t) > and Q - q{Q, t) < 0. Intuitively, this means that the slope of q is greater
than 1 as illustrated in Figure 5. Indeed imagine that for the largest Nash equilibrium Q', there
exists Q° > Q' such that Q° — q(Q°,t) < (this means intuitively that the slope is below unity,
see Figure 8). Then since q(Q°,t) > Q° > Q', no decreasing Novshek type selection could have
reached Q' and there would consequently have to be a larger Nash equilibrium Q* . This yields a
contradiction.
We now argue that Q" < Q' . As in the previous case, we prove this without explicit use
of continuity (the proof is straightforward if continuity is used directly as seen in Figure 7). In
particular, let us establish the stronger statement that hf{t) + Q is decreasing in t (since hx{t)
is increasing in t, this implies that Q must be decreasing in t). First define C = hr(t) + Q,
and consider the function f(C,t) = C - hT (t) - q{C - hT {t),t). Let C = h T {t) + Q and C =
hT {t) + Q. By what was just shown, f(C, t) = Q- q{Q, t) > and f{C, t) = Q - q{Q, t) < 0.
Since Bt (C — h.T{t),t) is independent of t (t cancels out in the definition of the backward reply
correspondence), q(C — h-T(t),t) must be constant in t, i.e., q(C — hr{t),t) = q{C) for some
function q which is increasing (since we are in Case II). So / is decreasing in t and Q, and we
conclude that in equilibrium f(C*(t),t) = 0, C*{t) = hx(t) + Q*{t) is decreasing in t.
Remark 9 The fact that the term hx(t) + Q is decreasing in t implies that, in this case, when
there is entry of an additional player, the aggregate of all of the agents (including the entrant)
decreases. To see this, compare with the proof of Theorem 5 and use that the aggregate of interest
is XZj M-Sj) + ^/+i(-s/+i) ( in other words, take hT {t) = hj+i(si+i)).
Combining the observations made so far shows that the largest equilibrium aggregate is de-
creasing in t as claimed in the theorem. None of the previous conclusions depend on continuity
of q in Q, and it is straightforward to verify that the same conclusions hold regardless of whether
Q lies in a convex interval (strategy sets could be discrete, say). 33 The statement for the smallest
See Kukushkin (1994) for the details of how the backward reply selection is constructed in such non-convex
cases.
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equilibrium aggregate can be shown by an analogous argument. In particular, instead of con-
sidering the selection q{Q, t) one begins with Q sufficiently low and studies the backward reply
correspondence above the 45° line, now choosing for every Q the smallest best response (Figure
9). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
11.3 Proof of Theorem 5
Let R4 denote the "reduced" backward reply correspondence defined by R (J2j-nhj(sj),t) =
J^(s_j,i) for each i. To simplify notation, let us set i = 1 (assume that the idiosyncratic shock
hits the first player, in particular then R, is independent of t — t\ for all i ^ 1). Any pure-
strategy Nash equilibrium will also be a fixed point of the set-valued equilibrium problem: si S
j?i ( 53j =^i ^j'( sj)> 'i ) arid hi(si) G hi o Ri I Ylj^i h( sj)) for z = 2, . . . , /. Consider the last I — 1
inclusions, rewritten as
hiis^ehioRi Vftjfo) + M*i) fori = 2,...,/. (19)
For given s\ £ Si, Theorem 3 implies that there exist a smallest and largest scalars y*(si) and
y*{s\) and solutions to the I — 1 inclusions in (19) which y*( s i) = Ylj^i^j( sj,*) an<^ V*{s i) —
Yljdki hj{s*,), respectively. In addition, y*, y* : S\ —> K are decreasing functions.
Now combining y* and y" that solve (19) in the sense described, with s% £ Ri ( 53i^i hj{sj), t\ J
and replacing s\ with sj = — si, we obtain a system with two inclusions:
Si e -Ri(y,ti)
and
ye {y*(-Si),2/*(-si)}.
This system is ascending in (sj, y) in the sense of Topkis (1998), hence its smallest and largest fixed
points are decreasing in t\ (since the system is descending in t\ in the sense of Topkis). Therefore,
the smallest and largest equilibrium strategies for player 1 are increasing in ii, while the associated
aggregate of the remaining players y is decreasing in t. That the smallest and largest strategies
for player 1 do in fact correspond to the smallest and largest strategies in the original game is
straightforward to verify: Clearly, y*(si) and y*(s\) are the smallest and largest aggregates of the
remaining players (across all strategy profiles compatible with an equilibrium given sj), and since
R\ is descending in y, the corresponding equilibrium values of s\ are, respectively, the largest and
the smallest.
Finally, it follows by construction that the corresponding aggregates of the remaining players
must be the smallest and largest for the original game. This completes the proof of the theorem.
11.4 Proof of Theorem 7
We begin by noting that there is no loss of generality in using the aggregator g{s) = J2i ^i(si) m
the following, and assuming that minSiSst /^(sj = for all i. To see why, recall that the local
solvability condition is independent of any strictly increasing transformation of the aggregator
(Remark 5). If the original aggregator is g(s) = H( j^i hi(si)) we can therefore use the transfor-
mation f{z) = H~ l {z) - Si minfi6Si M s ») t0 get tne new aggregator g(s) = f{g{s)) =X)iMst).
where hi(si) = hi(s z ) — minSi6 s, hi(si). Clearly, min^gs, hi(si) — for all i so this new aggregator
has all the desired properties.
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Let Ri : S_j x T —> Si be the best response correspondence of player i and Ri the reduced best
response correspondence defined by Ri(J2j^i^j( sj)^) — Ri{s-i,t). Define ^(^-^ hj(sj), t) =
^t ° ^idZi=4t ^j( sj'))0> anc^ write 77i G Bi(Q,t) whenever 77; 6 fj(Q - r)i, t). It is clear that if
r)i 6 Bi(Q,t) then there exists Sj G i^i(Q — h t (si),t) with 7ft = hi(si). So Q is an equilibrium
aggregate given i 6 T if and only if Q G Z(Q,t) = Y2 i B l (Q,t) (the correspondence Z is the
aggregate backward reply correspondence already studied in the proof of Theorem 3).
JXQ.0-Q
Figure 10: Q*{t) is the largest equilibrium aggregate given t G T.
The main idea in the proof of Theorem 7 is to study the behavior of the smallest and a largest
selections from Z, denoted below by q{Q,t) and q(Q,t), respectively. Take the largest selection
q(Q,t), and consider q(Q,t) — Q as a function of Q (Figure 10). Any intersection with the first
axis corresponds to an equilibrium aggregate since there q(Q, t) = Q and so Q G Z(Q, t). Since q
is the largest selection from Z, the largest such intersection corresponds to the largest equilibrium
aggregate Q*(t) as defined in (6). The desired result follows if we show that the equilibrium takes
the form depicted in Figure 10 and in addition that q and q are increasing in t. Indeed if this
is the case, it is clear that any increase in t will increase Q*[t). The same conclusion applies to
Q*{t), the smallest intersection in an analogous figure, except with q(Q, t) — Q on the vertical
axis rather than q(Q, t) — Q. This is the conclusion of the theorem. The general features of q
that ensured his conclusion are as follows. First, we must show that q is in fact well-defined on
a compact interval in Q (for all t G T), below denoted [#,Q]. This step is non-trivial and is the
most difficult part of the proof. Second, we must show that q(Q, t) is continuous in Q. Third, we
must show that q(Q,t) — Q "begins above the first axis and ends below it", i.e., we must show
that q(0,t) > and q(Q,t) < Q. Finally, we must prove that q is increasing in t. In order to
prove these claims, it turns out to be very convenient to introduce an index concept.
f,(Q-r\i) (solid),
T;(Q+A-ri,) (dashed) ./'
Figure 11: 77- G B Z (Q) if and only if the graph of fi(Q — r/,,) intersects the diagonal at 77'.
Consider (Q, 77^) with 77^ G Bi(Q). We say that the index of such [Q,r]i) is equal to -1 (+1) if
and only if ft {Q — z) — z is strictly decreasing (strictly increasing) in z on (r/i — e) U (77, + e), e >
(on the two one-sided open neighborhoods of 77,). If the index is not equal to either —1 or +1, it
is set equal to 0. These indices are well-defined whether or not r% is single-valued at Q — r\i since
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the local solvability condition implies that fi can be multivalued only at isolated points. 34
Figure 11 illustrates the situation including the indices just defined. For Q given, 77, G B t (Q)
if and only if the graph of ft (Q - •) meets the diagonal. The dashed curve illustrates an important
feature of B{\ When the aggregate is changed from Q to Q + A, A > say, this corresponds
exactly to a parallel right transformation of fi(Q — -)'s graph, i.e., every point on the curve in
the figure is moved to derive by exactly an amount A > 0. This simple observation has several
important consequences, (i) First, if any two points on the graph of Bx lie on a 45° line, then the
whole interval between these two points must lie on the graph of Bi. In particular, if rji G Bi(Q)
and T]i + A G B t (Q + A), then rh + S G B^Q + 5) for all 6 g [0, A], (ii) Second, if r?< E B^Q')
and the index of (77^, Q') is not zero, there exists a continuous function /, : (Q' — e, Q' + e) —» 5t
such that fi(Q) G B% {Q) and fi(Q') = ?],' In the following we shall refer to such a function as
a continuous selection through (jf^Q 1 ). This extension procedure can be repeated as long as the
index does not become equal to zero at any point or the boundary of 5,; is "hit" by the extension.
Indeed, imagine that fy : (Q' — e,Q' + e) —> Si is the continuous selection from before. By the
upper hemi-continuity of S, (which follows straight from upper hemi-continuity of B4) and the
continuity of fi follows that fi can be extended to the boundary points, /, : \Q' - e, Q' + e] —> Si
in such a way that it is still true that fi{Q) G B{(Q) for all Q. As long as the index is non-zero
on these boundary points, we can then take each of these as our starting point and start over in
order to get a continuous selection /, : \Q' — e', Q' + e'j —> 5t where e' > e. An important thing to
note about such a continuous selection that extends from an initial point [rn,Q) is that the index
never changes along the selection: If the index of (rji, Q) is —1 (+1), the index of (fi{Q), Q)) is
— 1 (+1) for all Q at which the continuous selection is defined, (iii) Thirdly, because fl (Q) >
for all Q > 0, the curve in Figure 11 always begins at rji = at or above the diagonal. Hence it
follows from the mean value theorem that if n'
i
G Bi(Q') for some Q' > 0, there will exist some
Vi e Bt {Q) for all Q > Q' . In other words: If Bi{Q') ^ for Q' > then B{ {Q) # for all Q > Q'
[When Q is raised to Q' the point (r/^Q') is shifted "to the right" and so will lie below the 45°
line/diagonal. By continuity the curve must therefore intersect the diagonal in order to get from
r)i = where it is above the diagonal to n^ where it is below it], (iv) Also from the fact that
fi{Q) ^ f°r all Q > follows that the index of the first intersection in the curve (corresponding
to the smallest element in Bl (Q)) will be equal to either —1 or whenever fi{Q) > 0. The case
where fl {Q) = is special and is considered in a footnote. 35 (v) Finally, imagine that for some
Q', n\ = max Bi(Q') (the largest elements in Bi{Q) C K+ ), and consider a continuous selection fi
through (rji, Q'). Again because the graph of fi is shifted to the right when Q is raised, it is easy
to verify from the figure that for all Q > Q' where fi is defined, fl {Q) = max B{(Q).
We are now ready to establish an important lemma.
Lemma 1 For each player i £l there exists a finite number of continuous functions 6ti i , . . . , bi Mi
each defined on [0j, Q] where 0i = minSiest f,(0) and Q = max{^ hi(s r ) G R+ : s G 5} and taking
values in K+ , such that for every Q G [0, Q], Bi(Q) = UmL 1 6j i7T[ ((5) (in particular Bt (Q) = for
Q < 8j). In addition, for m ^ m' G {1, . .
.
, Mi} it cannot happen that bltTn (Q) = bljn i{Q) for any
Q with biim (Q) > min^gs, hi(s,).
Proof. By construction Q
x G Bl (9l ). We are first going to show that Bt{Q) — for all Q < 6 t .
Clearly, for Q < Qz there cannot exist rji G Bl (Q) with n, > Q (indeed for such rji and Q we would
34
Precisely, if f,(Z) is not single-valued at Z. it must be single-valued on a sufficiently small neighborhood
of Z. This is a consequence of local solvability because this condition implies that for Q fixed, any solution to
t/i G fi(Q — r],) must be locally unique. Indeed, 17, € f t (Q - 7/,) <=> [//, = h,(si) k ^i{s t ,Q) = 0] and s, is locally
uniquely determined as a function of Q when \Ds^i\ ^ (see, e.g., Milnor (1965), p. 8).
35When ft (Q) = it is possible that the curve intersects the diagonal at (r]t ,fi(Q — 77,)) = (0,0) and "stays
above" the diagonal for all r;, > in a neighborhood of 0. If we extend our index definition above to boundary
points in the natural way, this intersection would have index +1 (the natural way to extend to a boundary point is
to require that the original index definition holds on a suitably restricted one-sided neighborhood).
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have to have Sj G Ri(Q - rji) where Q - rji < 0. But Ri is only defined on JZj^i hj(Sj) Q R+).
If Q < 6i and rji G Bj(Q), we must therefore have rji < Q (we cannot have equality because then
9i would not be the minimum of fj(0)). So assume, ad absurdum that rji < Q. Let Sj be such
that Si G ^i(Q — ?7i) (in particular then 7ft = hi(si)). Unless Sj is on the boundary of Sj, we
have $i(si, Q) = since first-order conditions are necessary for an interior solution. By the local
solvability condition therefore \DSi ^i(si,Q)\ ^ which implies that there exists a "downwards"
continuous selection through (rji,Q), fi (Q — e,Q] —* Si. At (fi(Q - e),Q - e) we again have
(unless fi(Q) = hi(si) where Sj is a boundary point and $>i(si,Q) = does not hold) that the
local solvability condition applies and so we can extend further downwards. This process continues
until we reach a point Q' < Q such that any Sj G Si with fi(Q') = hi(.Si) is a boundary point of
S{. If the index of (6i, 9i) is equal to +1, we can begin the above selection procedure from (0j, 9i)
and will, as mentioned, eventually reach a boundary point in the above sense. But when this
selection first "hits" the boundary ^i(si,Q) = still holds (^ is continuous), and so from the
local solvability condition follows that the index is (still) +1. Because of (i) above, this selection
is the maximal selection: There will be no rji G B t (Q) with rji > fi(Q) for any Q where fi is
defined. 36 If the index of (9i,9t ) is either or — 1, we can either still construct a continuous
downwards selection through (#j, 9% ) as the one above (precisely this happens in the index is and
the graph of fj(0j - •) intersects the diagonal from below), or else we can begin at (rji, Q) (where
as before Q < rji) and construct a similar maximal extension. Precisely this happens either if the
index of (8i, 9{) is —1 or if the index is and the graph of ft (9i — ) intersects the diagonal from
above. In either case the index of the downward selection through (rji,Q) must be +1 so this
leads to a situation that is entirely symmetric with the previous one.
In sum, at Q' there is exactly one solution to the equation $?i(si,Q') = and here hi(si) =
fi(Q')- And the index of (fi(Q'),Q') is equal to +1. Since fi(Q) > for any Q > 0, this implies
that a selection from Bt , different from fi, exists on [Q',Q' + e], e > (recall from (iv) above
that the index of the smallest selection from Bi is — 1 unless possibly if fj(0) = 0. But fj(0) =
cannot happen unless 9X = in which case the claim that Bt (Q) = for Q < Bi is vacuous).
This selection is of course locally non-decreasing (possibly constant). Importantly, it necessarily
has index equal to —1. But then two selections with different indices "meet" at Q'. This can
never happen if ^i(si,Q') = and z' = h l (s l ) hence we have arrived at a contradiction if payoff
functions are assumed to satisfy the first-order conditions at any best response for the players. If
not, we have a contradiction with regularity which specifically says that there does not exist an
aggregate such as Q' above where all backward replies' indices are positive.
We conclude that Bi(Q) — for Q < 8i which is what we set out to do. Along the way, we
also ended up concluding that the index of (9i,9i) cannot be +1, nor can it be if the graph
of fi(9i — •) intersects the diagonal from below. In either case, this implies that we can find a
continuous upwards selection through (8i, Bi). This selection has index —1 whenever ft (Q) is such
that fi(Q) = hi(si) where s^ is in the interior of 5, (in fact, it is sufficient that the first order
conditions hold, so this is always true in the multidimensional case and also in the one-dimensional
case unless fi(Q) is horizontal, in which case the statements below become trivial). Furthermore,
since this selection is maximal at 9i it remains the maximal selection from Bi for all Q > 9l
(this follows from (v) above). Finally, the selection will actually exist on all of [9 t , Q] because the
index is equal to —1 throughout (see also (iii) above). In term of the lemma's statement, we have
therefore found our first function bi
t
i : [6i, Q] —> M.+ , namely the maximal selection from B% that
intersects at (9i,9{).
Even under the local solvability condition, we cannot conclude that this is the only selection
36Imagine such a larger element in B, did exist, ^ 6 B,(Q). This would imply that the whole 45° segment between
{rn,Q) and the intersection of the graph of /t with the 45° line through (fj,,Q) would lie in B l 's graph. But this
is a contradiction because at the point where the 45° segment intersects with the graph of /,, local solvability
would be violated (local solvability implies, in particular, local uniqueness of selections, see footnote 34 for a similar
argument)
.
l!,
from B{. Local solvability does, however, imply that the number of selections must be finite
(or else they would not be locally isolated which is a fact we have used several times above).
In addition, local solvability rules out that any selection has index when $i(sj, Q) = for s,
with fi(Q) = hi(si). Hence the indices must be alternating in sign when ordered in the natural
way (the greatest selection above has index — 1, the next selection below it has index +1, etc.,
until the least selection which always has index —1). Also from local solvability follows that two
selection cannot intersect each other (except possibly at the "lower boundary" and not at all
when TV > 1). If they did intersect, i.e., if for any two selections m jt m! € {1, . .
.
, M{\ we had
bi,m{Q) = bi,m>(Q) for any Q with &t,m (Q) > mmSi£ g. /ii(sj), these selection would either have to
be equal everywhere (and so there is only one!), or else they would at some point deviate from
each other and at that point local uniqueness of selections (explained several times above) would
be violated.
What remains to be shown now is only that all selections are defined on [#,, Q]. This has
already been shown to be the case for the greatest selection blt \. That it is also true for the other
selections follows from a similar argument recalling that the indices must be alternating and that
the index of the least selection is —1. The details are omitted.
Let M.i = {I,..., Mi} where Mi is the number of functions of the previous lemma. Now
making the dependence on t explicit, we define
q(Q,t)= max VXm.tQ.O-
{mi,...,mj)eMi x...xMi —
i
Clearly q(Q, t) is only defined on [9, Q] where 9 = max, 9% . It is also clear that q takes values
in the interval [0, Q\. Prom now on we focus on q, which will prove the statement of Theorem
7 for the largest equilibrium aggregate. For the smallest aggregate one considers instead q(Q, t)
defined as above replacing max with min and proceeds as below with the obvious modifications.
The following lemma will essentially finish the proof of the theorem by establishing all of the
claims mentioned in our outline of the proof above.
Lemma 2 The function q : [6, Q] x T —> [0, Q] is continuous in Q on [0,Q], increasing in t on
T, and satisfies q{9) > 6 (of course we also have q(Q, t) < Q).
Proof. Continuity of q in Q follows directly from the definition of q and lemma 1. Let m'{i)
denote the index of the selection that solves (11.4) for player i e I. In the notation of the proof
of Lemma 1, m'(i) must in fact be equal to 1 for every player (the greatest selection). For this
greatest selection, it was shown in the proof of the Lemma that bl j(9j, t) = 9,. It follows that
q{@> — Si °i^(9, t) > 6;',i(#, t) = 9 where i' is any player for which 6, = 9. This proves the last
claim of the Lemma. Finally, we show that q is increasing in t. For any Q, 77, = bim'^(Q, t) if and
only if ?7j is the largest solution to the fixed point problem: £, £ ?i{Q~ £i, t). By assumption, t is a
positive shock in the sense that the smallest and largest selections of fi{Q — £,, t) = h l oRl{Q-^l , t)
are increasing in t (for all fixed Q and £j). Moreover, the smallest (respectively, the largest)
selection from an upper hemi-continuous correspondence with range R is lower semi-continuous
(respectively, upper semi-continuous). 37 In particular, the least selection is "lower semi-continuous
from above" and the greatest selection is "upper semi-continuous from below" . Hence any upper
hemi-continuous and convex valued correspondence with values in R satisfies the conditions of
37 Let F : X —» 2R be such a correspondence, and /. and /* the smallest and largest selections, i.e., f"(x) =
max^f^jz and f,(x) = -[dieocj6 .f(i)z]. Since the value function of a maximization problem is upper semi-
continuous when the objective function is continuous and the constraint correspondence is upper hemi-continuous,
it follows that /* is upper semi-continuous and moreover f.(x) = maXjj-p^j z is upper semi-continuous, thus
implying that /, = -/. is lower semi-continuous.
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Corollary 2 in Milgrom and Roberts (1994). We therefore conclude that bimi^(Q,t) is increasing
in t (and likewise that the smallest fixed point of & € fi(Q — &,£) is increasing in t which one
uses to prove the theorem's statement for the smallest aggregate). Clearly then, q(Q,t) is also
increasing in t.
As was mentioned above, when the continuous function q(Q, t) (where t is fixed) is shifted
everywhere up because t is increased, the largest solution of the equation Q = q(Q, t) must
increase (and for the smallest aggregate the same conclusion applies to the smallest solution of
q(Q, i) = Q). This completes the proof of the theorem.
11.5 Proof of Theorem 8
The statement is proved only for the smallest equilibrium aggregate (the proof for the largest
aggregate is similar). Let bmi be the least backward reply map as described in the proof of
Theorem 7. Let us define t{I+\) = sj
+1 6 K+ (i.e., as equal to the entrant's equilibrium strategy)
and t(I) = 0. Then Q,(I) and Q»(I + 1) are the least solutions to, Q(I) = g(b{Q{I)),t(I)) and
Q(I + 1) = g(b(Q(I + 1)), t(I + 1)), respectively. Since g is increasing in t and t(I) < t(I + 1),
this is a positive shock to the aggregate backward reply map. That Q*(I) < Q*(I + 1) must hold
then follows by the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 7. Clearly, Q*(I) = Q»(I + 1)
cannot hold unless t(I) = t(I + 1) since g is strictly increasing.
11.6 Proof of Proposition 3
We begin by verifying the local solvability condition in the contest game of Proposition 3. Direct
calculations yield
Vi(si,Q) = Vi
h\(Si ) H' (H-^Q)) hfadhi
R + Q (R + QY
c
'i isi)
and
£>s,*» =
h'(si)
Vi
R + Q [R + Q?
H'{H-\Q))(h[(s t )f
(R + QY
Therefore, when $j(s„Q) = 0, we have
£>.,,*<
h'ASr)
A l ^M-Vi (R + Q) 2
Dividing both sides by c[(si) > 0, we conclude that .D^^ < 0, and thus the local solvability
condition is satisfied and each 3^ is regular.
It is also straightforward to verify that ct — ct oh~ is a convex function under our hypotheses.
Next, consider the payoff function of player' i after the change of coordinates s,; h-» Zi = hi(si)
-l
(for i G J): 7Ti(z) = ViZi R + H(1l,j=i zj)\ ~ Ci{zi)- If DZi TTi(z) = is sufficient to ensure
that Zi is a global maximum, then the original first-order condition are also sufficient for a global
maximum. In particular, DZi fii(z) = implies that D22 Tti(z) < 0. Hence any interior extremum
is a strict maximum, from which follows that there is at most one extremum, necessarily a global
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maximum (it is possible that this maximum is on the boundary, though in this case it continues
to be unique; see also Remark 3).
Now, parts 1 and 2 the proposition follow directly from Theorems 7 and 8. Part 3 follows
from Theorem 9 by noting that the condition for s*(t) to be locally increasing in a positive shock
- [DMalgis'lfJl^DQViifilgWt) > 0. (20)
Since, as shown above, DSi ^i(s*,g(s*),t) < 0, (20) holds if and only if Dq*j(s*,Q*, t) > where
Q* = g(s*). For the same reason, the condition for s*(t) to be decreasing in t when t does not
directly affect player i (the second statement of part 3), is satisfied is and only if Dq^/^s*, Q*) < 0.
Since,
(R + Q*)2
(20) will hold if and only if
(R + Q *\3 [R + Q *\2
where
vm =
h(s*) > V (Q*),
2H'(H-\Q*)) H"(H- } (Q*))
(R + Q*) H'{H- l (Q*))
This shows that player i will increase its effort if it is "dominant" as defined in the proposition. If
instead hi(s*) < n(Q*), i.e., if the player is not "dominant", Dq^^s^Q*} < and by Theorem
9 follows that if the player is not affected by the shock, she will decrease her effort in equilibrium.
11.7 Proof of Theorem 1
1
We begin with a technical lemma:
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then:
(i) DSt ^i (sj, 53-=1 Sj,£) exists and all of its elements are non-positive; and
(ii) D 2
s Hi I Si, Yjj=i sji *) *s ^e^aiiue definite.
Proof. For a matrix A with non-negative off-diagonal entries the following four statements are
equivalent (see Berman and Plemmons (1994), pages 135-136): (1) all eigenvalues of A have
negative real parts; (2) all real eigenvalues of A are negative; (3) there exists a vector x E IR++
such that Ax E K^_; (4) A -1 exists and all of its elements are non-positive.
It is clear from (16) that if D^ s II, has non-negative off-diagonal entries and Dq^, is non-
positive, then DSl ^ t must have non-negative off-diagonal entries. By assumption, all real eigenval-
ues of
Ds^j (sj, ]Cj=i sj>t) are negative, hence (4) holds verifying the first claim of the lemma. For
the second claim, we use that (3) holds for DSt $„ and let x E 1R++ be such that DSi ^i x E
K^_. Clearly DQ^i x E M.^ because Dq^i is non-positive. Hence from (16) follows that
Dlsflr £j=i^* X E tN But then (since D 2 . s IT has non-negative off-diagonal elements)
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all of its eigenvalues have negative real parts, and being symmetric it is therefore negative definite.
Next note that since Dcjb = —[DSi '<i>i]~ 1 DQ'$>i, part (i) of Lemma 3 implies that the backward
reply function b is decreasing in Q (since Dq^/^ is a non-positive matrix in view of the fact that
the payoff function exhibits decreasing differences).
Finally, to establish the main result, differentiate Q = b(Q + t) to obtain:
dQ = DQ b{Q + t)dQ + DQ b{Q + t)dt.
Since Dqb(Q + t) is non-singular, this is equivalent to
[[DQb(Q + 1)}-
1
- X\dQ = dt.
The sufficiency part of the theorem will follow if we can show that dt > => dQ < 0. By the
previous equation, this is equivalent to: [[Dq6(Q + i)] _1 - I]dQ > =>• dQ < 0. An alternative
(but again equivalent) way of writing this is,
[I - [DQ b(Q + t)]~
l ]dQ > =*> dQ > . (21)
The statement in (21) is very well known in matrix algebra: a matrix A such that Ax > => x >
is called a monotone matrix (Berman and Plemmons (1994)). A well known result from matrix
algebra tells us that a matrix is monotone if and only if it is a non-singular A<f-matrix (Berman
and Plemmons (1994), page 137). Since [I - \Dqb(Q + t)}' 1 } is non-singular by assumption, it is
a non-singular M-matrix when it is an M-matrix (as assumed in the theorem). Hence, it will be
monotone and so any small increase in t (in one or more coordinates) will lead to a decrease in
each of Q's coordinates.
As for the theorem's necessity statement, assume that [I— [DQb(Q + t)]~ i
]
is not an Af-matrix.
By the result just used, this is the same as saying that [I — [DqbiQ + t)]~ ] is not monotone,
which implies that dQ £ and [I - [DQb(Q + t)]- l ]dQ < for at least one vector dQ e RN .
We cannot have [I — [DQb(Q + t)]~ l ]dQ = since I — [Dqb(Q + t)]" 1 is non-singular; hence
[I - [DQb(Q + t)]~^]dQ < for some such vector dQ ^ 0. Now we simply pick t" - t' = dt =
— [I— [DQb(Q+ t)]~^]dQ > and the associated change in the aggregate dQ will then be increasing
in at least one coordinate/component, which is the statement of the theorem.
11.8 Proof of Theorem 14
We begin with Theorem 7. To simplify the notation in the proof, let us focus on the case with
a linear aggregator, g(s) — 5Zi=i sj (the general case is proved by the exact same argument, the
only difference is that it becomes very notation-heavy). Then, for each i, Gi(Q
: y) = Q — y. Define
Mi(y, t) = argmaxQ^j, Ui(Q -y,Q). Clearly, Mt {y, t) - {y} = FLj,(y, t), where Rt is the "reduced"
best response correspondence (i.e., best response as a function of the sum of the opponents'
strategies). Hence, we can write Mi(Q — Si,t) — {Q} = Ri{Q — s,,t) — {s^}. Given single-
crossing, M{(y,t) is ascending in y {e.g., Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Theorem 4). Therefore,
B^(Q — Si,t) - {.Si} must be descending in s t . Moreover, R^(Q — &i,t) - {s t } is convex-valued.
Let Bi{Q, t) = { Sl eSi-.Sifz Ri{Q - su t)}. Bl {Q, t) £ since: z £ Ri(Q - ± t ,t) => z - U >
(where
_Lj = min5t ), while z <E Ri{Q - Tj, t) => z - T t < 0. 38 It may be verified that Bt (Q, t) is
38Here it is necessary to extend Rt by denning i?,(z) = {R,(0)} when z < 0, where we have here taken ±j =
for all j so that the least value Q can assume is 0. It is clear that with this extension Ri(Q - s,) — {si} is (still)
descending and now always passes through 0. Importantly, the extensions (one for each agent), do not introduce
any new fixed points for B = J2, Bj: Given Q, if s, e Ri(Q - Si), then either Q - Si > or Q < Si e FU(Q — s t ).
But if Sj > Q for just one i, we cannot have J\ s 3 = Q.
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